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ABORTION AND TECHNOLOGY:  SONOGRAMS, FETAL PAIN, 
VIABILITY, AND EARLY PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 
John A. Robertson* 
Attempts to limit abortion continue in state legislatures and in national politics.  Many proposed 
restrictions arise from new technologies for visualizing and testing fetuses.  This article examines 
the role that technology has played in past abortion conflict, showing the illusory nature of the 
belief that technology might dampen the virulence of the debate.  It then looks at four recent 
technologies at the center of abortion controversy:  forced viewing of sonogram; earlier survivability 
of premature newborns; fetal pain-capability before 24 weeks; and early noninvasive prenatal 
diagnosis.  It shows the challenges that each technology poses for existing doctrinal understandings 
of abortion rights, such as the undue burden test, the 24 week line for viability, and the 
impermissibility of state inquiry into a woman’s reasons for abortion.  It concludes with a 
comparison of the effect of technology on Fourth and Eight Amendment jurisprudence, and shows 
why changes in abortion technology present a different set of problems.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Abortion controversy continues in state legislatures and in nation-
al politics.  The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzalez v. Carhart 
and the 2010 mid-term elections have reinvigorated anti-abortion 
groups.  Pro-choice groups, on the other hand, take heart from the 
growing acceptance of medical abortions as “[a]nother pill that could 
cause a revolution.”1 
 
 1 Nicholas Kristof, Another Pill That Could Cause a Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at 
WK8 (suggesting that new, widely available forms of medication could be safely used to 
induce abortions). 
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While many issues figure in current controversies, it is hard to 
overlook the role that technological developments are playing in the 
debate.  The dream that technology can cut the Gordian knot of 
abortion politics is not new, but is being reasserted with renewed vi-
gor.  The anti-abortion side puts its faith in forced viewing of fetal so-
nograms and alleged new evidence of when fetuses feel pain.  The 
pro-choice side thinks that attention to in vitro fertilized (IVF) em-
bryos and the safety of pills that induce miscarriage will reduce resis-
tance to choice in reproduction. 
Although often appealed to as an arbiter of conflict, technology is 
invariably a chimera that seldom manages to fulfill that role.  Atten-
tion, however, to how technological change is used in the abortion 
debate and why that appeal is so often illusory may teach something 
about the essence of the constitutional debate and its contours, and 
show where there is room for change and evolution.  That is the bur-
den of this Article. 
A.  Legislative Developments 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed 
the basic principles of Roe v. Wade but scrapped its trimester frame-
work, and affirmed the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life 
throughout pregnancy.2  With its looser undue burden test, Casey 
opened the door to more regulation than had been acceptable under 
Roe.  Many states took up the invitation, enacting informed consent, 
waiting periods, parental consent or notification laws, record keeping 
requirements, and much else.  Gonzales v. Carhart3 in 2007 nudged the 
door open a bit further by upholding a federal ban on partial birth 
abortion thanks to Justice Kennedy, a key member of the Casey plural-
ity, becoming the fifth vote in Gonzales.4  Even if the scope of new 
 
 2 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79 (1992) (“We reject the rigid 
trimester framework of Roe v. Wade . . . [and] reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to 
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it 
chooses, regulate and even proscribe, abortion . . . .’” (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 164–65 (1973))). 
 3 Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (finding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 
2003 was not void for vagueness and did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right 
to abortion). 
 4 At issue was whether there were alternatives that were as safe for the woman’s health as 
the partial birth procedure that had been banned.  Justice Kennedy, in contrast to most 
medical experts, found that the banned posed no threat to health.  See, e.g., id. at 180 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of the district court’s findings that the gov-
ernment’s witnesses had “slim authority for their opinions” that intact D&E was never ne-
cessary to preserve the health of the woman). 
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regulatory leeway is small, the victory has energized anti-abortion 
forces to chip away at the right recognized in Roe and Casey. 
The midterm elections of 2010 have further reinvigorated the 
right-to-life movement.  Although those elections focused on the 
economy, “many of the newly elected governors and legislators are 
also solidly anti-abortion, causing advocates of abortion rights to 
brace for a year of even tougher battles than usual.”5  Twenty-nine 
states now have governors considered to be solidly anti-abortion, 
compared with twenty-one in 2010.  “In fifteen states both the legisla-
ture and the governor are [now] anti-abortion.”6 
State legislatures have used their new political clout in a variety of 
areas.  Several states have increased waiting periods prior to abortion, 
expanded mental health screening of women to make sure they can 
give informed consent, exempted doctors from liability for failing to 
reveal fetal anomalies during pregnancy, and targeted abortion pro-
viders with more stringent health requirements.7  In a few states, one 
house of the legislature has passed or entertained bills that endow 
the fetus with legal personhood from the time of conception.8 
More significantly, many anti-abortion states have tried in various 
ways to limit private health insurance coverage of abortion or state 
funding of non-abortion services by abortion providers.  Five states 
 
 5 Erik Eckholm, Across Country, Lawmakers Push Abortion Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at 
A14 (suggesting that Republican victories in the November 2010 midterm elections ener-
gized conservative state lawmakers to push for legislation limiting abortion). 
 6 Id. 
 7 The most striking here is South Dakota’s enactment of a law requiring a three-day wait 
between receiving state-mandated informed consent and the abortion, an expansion of 
the twenty-four hour waiting period.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56 (Supp. 2011); 2011 
S.D. Sess. Laws Ch. 161. § 3; Michael Avok & David Bailey, South Dakota Law Requires 3-Day 
Abortion Wait, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/us-
abortion-southdakota-idUSTRE72L65320110322; see also, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-
202 (West 2011) (requiring any physician’s offices or other type of facility that perform 
abortions to post a sign which explains that it is illegal for anyone to coerce a woman into 
having an abortion); H.B. 2656, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at 
http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/WebBillStatus/main.html (protecting doctors from 
lawsuits if they facilitate the birth of children, even if those children suffer from medical 
conditions); Eckholm, supra note 5, at A14 (“The elections brought even more gains for 
their side than expected, said Mary Spaulding, state policy director of the National Right 
to Life Committee . . . .”); A.G. Sulzberger & Monica Davey, New Law in Kansas Seen as a 
Threat to Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A11 (discussing the controversy over a 
new license law that sets standards for abortion providers in the state). 
 8 Although such laws would not reverse Roe and Casey, they could limit what is done with 
surplus embryos in assisted reproduction and have many other implications.  See John A. 
Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1490–91 (2008) (discussing the controversy surrounding as-
sisted reproduction, genetic selection, and genetic enhancement).  But see Katharine Q. 
Seelye, Mississippi Voters Reject Anti-Abortion Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at A20. 
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enacted laws barring insurers from covering abortion in the insur-
ance exchanges called for under the Affordable Health Care Act 
passed under President Obama, and more are likely to do so in 2011.9  
Indeed, some states are seeking to ban any private health insurance 
policies that include coverage for abortion.  Several statues have also 
defunded Planned Parenthood for non-abortion related services, 
such as contraception and cancer screening.10  These bans apply both 
to state Medicaid funds, some of which come from the federal gov-
ernment, and independent state expenditures, even though no mon-
ey is directly paid for abortions themselves. 
Other restrictions have roots in the technological change that is 
the topic of this Article:  fetal pain and sonogram laws.  Nebraska has 
led the way with a 2010 ban on abortion after twenty weeks on the 
theory that the fetus is then pain-capable, a month earlier than the 
viability line in Roe and Casey.11  Several states have followed this lead 
 
 9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-26-134 (West 2011) (making it illegal for health care plans to cov-
er abortions); S.B. 1305, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/49leg/2r/laws/0114.htm 
(prohibiting state and federal funding of abortions except in the case of medical necessi-
ty); S.B. 241, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011), available at 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2011/IN/IN0241.1.html (making it illegal for insur-
ance companies to offer coverage for elective abortions); S.B. 3214, 125th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Miss. 2010), available at http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2010/pdf/SB/3200-
3299/SB3214IN.pdf (disallowing health plans that cover abortions from participating in 
health exchanges within Mississippi); S.B. 793, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2010), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/10info/pdf-bill/tat/SB793.pdf (prohibiting 
health insurance exchanges from funding abortions). 
 10 North Carolina, Indiana, and Kansas have already passed such laws.  See H.B. 1210, 117th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); H.B. 2075, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws. Ch. 111; H.B. 
200, N.C. Sess. Laws 2011-145.  The “freedom of choice” provision in the federal Medica-
id statute prevents a state from restricting recipients’ freedom to choose their health care 
provider, and a federal judge has enjoined the law from going into effect.  See Planned 
Parenthood of Ind. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, No. 1:11-cv-630-TWP-
TAB, 2011 WL 2532921 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2011) (granting, in part, a preliminary injunc-
tion that stops the state of Indiana from terminating all contracts with entities providing 
abortions); Robert Pear, Indiana Law to Cut Planned Parenthood Funding Is Blocked, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A11 (“The judge . . . blocked provisions of a new state law that 
penalized Planned Parenthood because some of its clinics performed abortions.”).  Non-
Medicaid state funds are another matter. 
 11 Pain-Capable Protection of Unborn Children Act, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3, 104(1) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (finding that “[a]t least by twenty weeks after fertilization there 
is substantial evidence that an unborn child has the physical structures necessary to expe-
rience pain”).  Iowa has pushed the envelope further by placing the ban at eighteen 
weeks, and Ohio legislators would go even further by banning all abortions after a fetal 
heartbeat is detected, which usually occurs at eight to ten weeks of pregnancy.  See H.B. 
125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2011); Laura Bassett, Iowa Advances Nation’s First 
18-Week Ban on Abortion, HUFFINGTON POST, June 9, 2011, http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/06/09/iowa-advances-nations-fir_n_874410.html. 
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and several more are expected.12  The evidence supporting such laws 
is controversial, but differing views of the strength of evidence is not 
alone sufficient to render a law unconstitutional.  With Gonzales show-
ing more deference to legislatures, such laws could lead to an earlier 
ban on abortion than has been recognized since 1973. 
Another set of technologically based restrictions is the growing 
use of sonogram technology as an anti-abortion weapon.  Several 
states already require that doctors offer a woman a chance to see a 
sonogram of the fetus prior to the abortion.  Oklahoma, however, has 
gone further by requiring that the “ultrasound screen be visible to 
the woman, though she may avert her eyes”13 at least one hour before 
the abortion.14  If she does, she must listen to the doctor or sono-
grapher provide a detailed description of the fetus.  Texas requires 
that the sonogram be done or described twenty-four hours before the 
abortion and that the woman listen to the fetal heartbeat or a de-
scription of it as well.15  Anti-abortion activists are promoting such 
laws in other states.  If such laws were valid, they would greatly in-
crease state regulatory power under Casey’s undue burden test.16 
In addition to legislative activity, there was a significant technolo-
gical advance in early non-invasive prenatal diagnosis that makes it 
likely that genetic assessment of fetuses may soon be available at five 
weeks of pregnancy.  If proven reliable, such testing is likely to be-
come routine in many, if not most pregnancies, greatly increasing the 
number of abortions on genetic risk grounds.  If so, there will be leg-
islative attempts to restrict prenatal testing or use of test results, thus 
calling into question the acceptable grounds for abortion and tests to 
establish them.17 
These developments are playing out against a background of the 
growing use of medical abortion in the first trimester.  In 2008, 17% 
of all abortions and 25% of first trimester abortions in the United 
 
 12 As of June 27, 2011 Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Alabama have done so.  See 
Erik Eckholm, New Laws in 6 States Ban Abortions After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, 
at A10 (detailing the increasing number of limitations on abortions throughout the coun-
try). 
 13 John Leland, Abortion Foes Advance Cause at the State Level, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2010, at A18. 
 14 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (West 2011).  The law’s operation has been enjoined.   
 15 See Chuck Lindell, Sonogram Bill on Fast Track, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1 
(detailing the legislative history of the bill requiring a woman to receive a sonogram of 
the fetus prior to having an abortion).  Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Ohio, Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming are also likely to consider such legislation.  See Eckholm, supra note 
5, at A14 (discussing movements by conservatives legislators to limit abortions). 
 16 The forced viewing/hearing required in Oklahoma is a more significant burden than 
having to sign a refusal as the Florida bill had required. 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 125–39. 
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States used non-surgical, medical means, which avoid the need to go 
to an abortion clinic and open the door to telemed terminations, 
greatly increasing access to abortion providers.18  Medical abortions 
have enormous potential worldwide to save the 70,000 lives a year 
that are lost to complications of often illegal surgical abortions, most 
of which occur in developing countries.19  They represent “a revolu-
tion in women’s reproductive health . . . [by] increas[ing] access to 
safe abortion[s] at minimal cost.”20 
These developments illustrate once again the role that technology 
plays in the abortion debate.  Some people think that advances in 
scientific knowledge and abortion technology will tilt the controversy 
to one pole or the other or at least in some areas soften the sharp 
edges of the debate.21  In this Article I argue otherwise by focusing on 
four changes in technology that now loom large in the abortion de-
bate and show how, though they may rebalance rights and in some 
cases offer the chance for a greater accommodation among warring 
factions than has yet existed, none will change the basic premises of 
the debate. 
B.  Plan of the Article 
Before focusing on these four technological changes and their 
chimeric- or reality-based role in resolving abortion issues, Part II de-
scribes the role that technological change has played in the spread 
and development of abortion rights and its ongoing appeal in more 
recent controversies. 
Part III discusses the recurring but illusory ways in which propo-
nents on each side hope for support from technological develop-
ments for their position.  Despite the inability of technology per se to 
resolve core normative issues, attention to technology and its limited 
ability to offer solutions may still be useful in revealing the value 
commitments, legal positions, and contradictions of each side. In 
 
 18 See Monica Davey, Abortion Drugs Given in Iowa Via Video Link, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at 
A1 (detailing how doctors can, using computers and teleconferencing, provide mifepris-
tone medication to induce abortions). 
 19 Kristof, supra note 1. 
 20 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 21 State Senator Lautenbaugh captured this sentiment in a public hearing on the Nebraska 
fetal pain bill when he asked a witness:  “And is it your belief that since technology 
marches on and we’ve made great strides that it’s at least possible that opinions from 20–
30 years ago might not hold a lot of validity anymore based upon what we know now?”  
Adopt the Abortion Pain Prevention Act:  Hearing on LB 1103 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 
2010 Leg., 101st Sess. 22 (Neb. 2010) [hereinafter Hearing on LB 1103] (statement of Sen. 
Scott Lautenbaugh, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary). 
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doing so, techology will show where there is room for change in the 
legal and doctrinal aspects of the debate.  Having that effect, howev-
er, is dependent on continued acceptance of a due process or equal 
protection “living Constitution” approach to interpreting the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments and continued acceptance of the re-
productive rights found within.22 
Part IV discusses how an equality or equal citizenship stance com-
plements a due process liberty approach to abortion but is not essen-
tial to elucidating the limited solutions that technological change of-
fers in the abortion debate.  Although every due process claim about 
abortion can be recast in equal citizenship terms, that approach is 
more apt for challenges to access to abortion than it is for whether 
the right to abort includes the right to select fetal and offspring ge-
netic traits.  This is the question presented by developments in early 
prenatal testing and abortion to select fetal genomic traits. 
Part V addresses the limits of sonogram technology as a way to 
persuade women to refrain from abortion by mandating that women 
view sonograms of their fetus shortly before a planned abortion or 
hear a detailed description of it.23  This analysis rests on what counts 
as an undue burden under Casey when the state purports to make 
consent more mature and intelligent by requiring the woman to view 
(or listen to a description of) the fetus that the abortion would de-
stroy.  It asks whether mandating accurate information regarding 
risks and consequences, which has been the focus of most litigation 
in this area, itself becomes ideological when forced on a woman who 
wishes fervently not to view a sonogram of her fetus. 
Part VI deals with the import of improvement in neonatal inten-
sive care and other technologies that extend the survivability of fetus-
es earlier than the twenty-four-week viability line drawn in Roe and 
maintained ever since.24  As part of that inquiry, it also addresses the 
import of technical advances in neuroscience that appear to provide 
a basis for claiming that the fetus is sufficiently developed neurologi-
cally at twenty weeks to be capable of sensing pain, and thus whether 
previable pain-capability is an independent ground for limiting abor-
tions. 
 
 22 Obviously, a reversal of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a right to privacy 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution extends to a woman’s decision to have an abortion), would change the landscape 
significantly.  Whether technology still played an important role would depend upon the 
scope of subsequent legislation. 
 23 Alternatively, women can opt to hear a detailed description of it. 
 24 Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 
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Part VII deals with the less invasive and earlier forms of prenatal 
diagnosis that are about to enter routine obstetrical practice.  If this 
promise is fulfilled, they are likely to greatly increase the number of 
women who learn, early in pregnancy, genetic information about 
their fetuses and then abort based on the results of those tests.  Such 
a prospect is likely to inspire some states to restrict the kinds of pre-
natal tests that are available or what one might do with them, thus 
raising novel questions about the extent to which abortion rights exist 
regardless of the reasons or basis for the abortion. 
Part VIII discusses how the importance of technological change in 
abortion is linked to the Court’s willingness to find reproductive 
rights in its interpretation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Constitution.  It shows how similar interpretive prob-
lems arise from technological change affecting other constitutional 
provisions as well, using the Fourth and Eighth Amendments as ex-
amples.  While those parallels show the constraints that courts face in 
using technology in constitutional interpretation, they also show how 
technological change may have a greater potential in the abortion 
rights area for insight into legal and doctrinal change than in those 
other subject areas. 
Each of the areas discussed focuses on a technology affecting a 
different part of pregnancy and its differing impacts on women.  The 
sonogram issue is most relevant to later first-trimester and early 
second-trimester abortions, when the majority of abortions occur.  
Viability and fetal pain questions affect abortions from twenty to 
twenty-six weeks (late second and early third trimester).  Early pre-
natal diagnosis brings us back to first-trimester abortions at five to 
nine weeks.  So stages and trimesters inexorably work their way back 
in, with a finer-grained assessment than the rough-hewn and perhaps 
prematurely disparaged trimester approach Roe v. Wade allowed. 
As I will argue, the idea that attention to technology will shear off 
the rough edges of the abortion debate is more a fantasy than a reali-
ty, but there are ways in which close attention to technological devel-
opments in embryology, genomics, neuroscience, and neonatology 
can illuminate the normative and legal issues at stake and advance 
constitutional understanding and possibly even accommodation.  
Doing so cannot occur without a Court receptive to its role as curator 
of the doctrinal positions regarding reproductive liberty and women’s 
rights to which its past decisions have led, including the scope and 
meaning of procreative liberty in abortion, assisted reproduction, and 
beyond.  At the very least the inquiry can deepen the debate and thus 
what might be legislatively acceptable in the space the Court leaves 
for regulation of abortion. 
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II.  THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 
ABORTION 
Technology has played a role in the development of abortion 
rights and its ensuing controversies, including many of the newly 
enacted or proposed restrictions on abortion.  Roe grew out of the 
development of vacuum aspiration methods of abortion in the 1960s 
and the imaging techniques that supported it.  Although abortions at 
the time were mostly done in hospitals, those techniques lent them-
selves to routinization in free-standing clinics, which, due to stigma 
and medical resistance by mainstream doctors to abortion in the 
1970s and 1980s, came to replace hospitals as the main site for abor-
tions.25  If the incipient movement to bring abortion into a gynecolo-
gist’s or family doctor’s office takes off, its success will owe much to 
technological advances in early suction and medical abortion.26 
The battles over the content of informed consent laws as to the 
risks of abortion are not about technology per se, though they do 
lean on putative medical claims about the personal and public health 
effects of any abortion, including those in the first trimester.  The 
partial-birth abortion controversy in the 1990s may also be seen as the 
product of technological development—in this case, Dr. Martin 
Haskell’s development of intact dilation and evacuation in late 
second-trimester abortions when trunk or head size made ordinary 
evacuation difficult.  Initially practiced by him alone and not part of 
ob/gyn residency programs or taught in medical schools, Dr. 
Haskell’s technique became, within a few years, a technique of choice 
 
 25 This also explains why so many of the early cases, from Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), 
to Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), and City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), involved  requirements that 
hospitals had to meet in order to perform abortions.  Emily Bazelon reports that, at the 
time Roe was decided, 80% of abortions were done in hospitals with many doctors partici-
pating, but abortion then moved to free-standing clinics as stigma and opposition built.  
See Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 18, 2010, at 32 
(discussing the shift of abortions away from mainstream physicians). 
 26 Bazelon also notes, 
 Technological advances have made it easier to shift abortion to the earlier stages 
of pregnancy.  Tests have become sensitive enough to detect pregnancies two 
weeks after conception.  The M.V.A., or manual vacuum aspirator, is gradually re-
placing the electric pump as the equipment of choice for  first-trimester proce-
dures.  It’s about 10 inches long, costs only $30 and looks like the kind of ap-
pliance you might find in a kitchen drawer. 
  Id. at 37, 44.  A doctor can carry all the equipment needed for an M.V.A. procedure in 
her coat pocket, thus demonstrating its ease of use to other physicians. 
Dec. 2011] ABORTION & TECHNOLOGY 337 
 
for some situations and was backed by the American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).27 
Other developments and controversies are even more clearly 
based on technological change.  Fetal sonograms, which figure in the 
new Oklahoma and Texas laws, are not new.  They have been around 
since the early 1970s and have improved in resolution and ubiquity.  
It is a central part of abortion and other medical practice to confirm 
pregnancy, gestational age, the number of fetuses, fetal anomalies, 
fetal position, and much more.  Although not a recently developed 
technology, the requirement that women view a sonogram or listen to 
an account of it is a new wrinkle on an old issue.  As we will see, 
forced viewing/hearing does not challenge the basic assumptions of 
Roe and Casey as developments in neonatology, fetal pain-capability, 
and early prenatal diagnosis do, but it does put pressure on the 
meaning of a woman’s autonomy and informed consent under Ca-
sey’s undue burden test.28 
Advances in neonatology have always been a favorite example of 
how technology may affect abortion rights.  Neonatal intensive care 
technology has consistently extended viability to earlier stages of 
pregnancy, so that viability in some sense has been pushed back from 
the twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks first recognized in Roe to twenty-
two weeks or earlier, allowing 500–600-gram fetuses to survive, albeit 
with a high risk of disability and impairment, thus giving anti-
abortion forces more room to ban abortions.29  Justice O’Connor rec-
ognized the “collision course” that improvements in neonatal tech-
nology posed for Roe’s trimester approach in 1983 in City of Akron and 
used that insight to articulate the undue burden test which moved to 
 
 27 Despite a trial record that showed there were valid health needs for use of the technique 
to minimize the risk of infection, perforation of the uterus, and other physical risks, Jus-
tice Kennedy found enough evidence in one of the three trials attacking the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 to rule otherwise.  See Pub. L. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1531) (2006) (prohibiting physicians from performing partial-birth abor-
tions).  His opinion for the Court held that Congress could rationally find that a consen-
sus about the health need for an exception was lacking.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on the grounds that it 
did not impose an undue burden on the due process right of women to obtain an abor-
tion).  Otherwise, the opinion of a few doctors could always bar otherwise seemingly ra-
tionally based legislation. 
 28 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992) (holding that a 
state’s regulation of abortion is unconstitutional if it places an undue burden on women 
seeking an abortion, which occurs when a state’s regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion or a nonviable 
fetus). 
 29 See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
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center stage in Casey ten years later.  Senator Lindsey Graham raised 
it again in the confirmation hearings for Justice Kagan.30 
The Nebraska ban on abortion at twenty weeks, based on the fe-
tus’s alleged capability to feel pain, is connected with developments 
in neonatology and viability but has independent technological sup-
port in neuroscience and brain development.  The technology here is 
less about gross anatomy as such, and more about how the develop-
ing neural apparatus of the fetus connects with the cortical, nonsen-
sory subcortical, and thalamic centers where pain is sensed and re-
sponded to.31  While much of the physiology of the brain has become 
known, much also remains controversial.  This has not stopped anti-
abortionists from seeking to ban abortion at twenty weeks based on 
claims of fetal pain-capability, thus providing a new ground and earli-
er time for banning abortion than the later viability line recognized 
in Roe and Casey. 
A technology on the verge of entry into routine obstetrical prac-
tice is early noninvasive prenatal diagnosis, which will give chromo-
 
 30 See (TRANSCRIPT) Senator Graham Questions Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan—Round 
Two, LINDSEY GRAHAM (June 30, 2010), available at http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorGraham.Blog&ContentRecord_id=8af83496-802a-
23ad-4610-22b0873a0cd8&Region_id=&Issue_id= [hereinafter LINDSEY GRAHAM].  The 
most relevent portion of the hearing occurred as follows: 
Graham:  . . . Now, there’s another court decision called Roe v. Wade that’s being 
changed over time, being interpreted differently over time.  The court basically 
held that, before viability, the right to have an abortion was—of a state to impose 
limitations on abortion was almost nonexistent.  After viability, it was sort of a ba-
lancing test.  Is that a general statement of Roe v. Wade over time, there’s a differ-
ence between viability and post-viability in the eyes of the court? 
Kagan:  As I understand the law after Casey, it’s that, after viability, the state can 
regulate as it pleases, except for situations where the woman’s life or health inter-
ests are at issue.  Before viability, the question is whether there is an undue burden 
on the woman’s ability to have an abortion. 
Graham:  It is fair for the court to consider scientific changes in—when a fetus be-
comes viable as medical science evolves? 
Kagan:  Senator Graham, I do think that in every area that it is fair to consider 
scientific changes.  We’ve—I’ve—I’ve talked in the past about how different forms 
of technology influence the evolution of the court’s Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. 
  At this point Senator Graham refers to racial segregation of young school children.  Al-
though unrelated to abortion technology and scientific developments as such, it does re-
late to issues of living constitutionalism and how values and hence the meaning of the 
broad clauses of the Constitution change over time. 
Graham:  Well, I’m—I’m glad to hear you say that, because just as it would have 
been wrong to not consider the changes of how society had evolved versus segre-
gation of young children based on race, I hope the court would consider the 
modern concept of viability in the 21st century.  And whatever protection you 
could give the unborn would be much appreciated on my part by considering 
science, not your personal feelings, because I think it’s appropriate for the court 
to do so. 
 31 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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somal and even genetic information about fetuses as early as five 
weeks.  The technology concerns the recovery from a pregnant wom-
an’s blood of fetal DNA and RNA sequences free of fetal cells, thus 
eliminating the need to intrude into the uterus or amniotic sac to ob-
tain them and risk causing miscarriage.32  The technological innova-
tion, however, is less the recovery of the fetal-free genomic material 
than the development of the algorithms and techniques for connect-
ing those snippets into a meaningful and informative picture of the 
fetus’s chromosomes and genes.  This opens the door to routine 
chromosomal/genetic testing of fetuses as early as five weeks and po-
tentially the performance of many more early abortions done to avoid 
genetic risks. 
The drugs that now allow for chemical abortions safely and effec-
tively up until nine weeks of pregnancy are also a technology that 
could change access to abortion and the perception of the moral and 
legal issues at stake.  Unlike postcoital contraception, which operates 
mainly by preventing implantation, chemical abortions interrupt or 
abort the earliest stages of implantation.  They do so, however, with-
out an entry to evacuate the uterus, and can be administered in a 
doctor’s office or at home.33  A urine test can confirm pregnancy at 
two weeks.  Typically, one pill (mifepristone, or RU486) is taken in 
the doctor’s office and, forty-eight hours later, a second pill (miso-
prostol, a common prostaglandin) is taken at home, with a return vis-
it to the doctor’s office to confirm that the pregnancy has ended.  Af-
ter six years of regulatory battle, the FDA finally approved RU486 in 
2000.  Many had thought it would bring abortion into ordinary medi-
cal practice and quiet some of the most heated debate.  Although it 
has helped increase the number of early abortions (90% of abortions 
now occur in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, with 62% of them 
before nine weeks), it has not become part of routine office practice 
and has not had the calming effect on clinic controversy that many 
had hoped for.34  Still, medical abortions comprised 17% of all abor-
 
 32 This is similar to how standard prenatal diagnosis techniques of amniocenteses and cho-
rion villus sampling are done, later in pregnancy.  See infra notes 127–28 and accompany-
ing text. 
 33 For authority on medical abortion, see Marge Berer, Medical Abortion:  A Fact Sheet, 
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov. 2005, at 20 (explaining the risks and potential of non-
surgical abortions). 
 34 See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:  FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 63–66 (1994) (explaining the benefits of and challenges facing new re-
productive technologies).  In any event, presumably all state regulations for waiting pe-
riods, informed consent, parental notification and the like apply both to medical and 
surgical abortions. 
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tions in 2008 and 25% of those done in the first nine weeks.35  It is 
waiting in the wings if greater physician willingness to do early abor-
tions emerges.  Telemedicine can extend access to abortion in areas 
where abortion providers are few. 
In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) and assisted reproductive technology 
(“ART”) are major technological developments that overlap norma-
tively with the abortion debate, though they do not directly affect 
abortion itself.  IVF research was underway in 1973, but the first IVF 
child was not born until five years after Roe, in 1978.  Since then, its 
use has spread widely as a treatment for infertility, with 120,000 child-
ren born every year in the United States and more than 1.5 million 
worldwide.36  External fertilization has not been central to abortion 
battles, simply because no pregnancy exists when the fertilized eggs 
and embryos are still in a petri dish or laboratory freezer, but it does 
raise the issue of the state’s power to value embryos for their own 
sake. 
Anti-abortion forces ignored IVF and ART until the ability to cul-
ture human embryonic stem cells, derived from discarded IVF em-
bryos from infertile couples, was developed in 1998, and the question 
of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research became a nation-
al issue.  This has emboldened anti-abortion forces to pay more heed 
to IVF labs and to propose state laws or constitutional amendment, 
none yet enacted, that would limit the number of embryos created or 
that can be discarded in treating fertility patients.  While these devel-
opments touch more directly assisted reproduction practice than they 
do abortion, the widespread acceptance of IVF and embryo discard-
ing clashes with the normative premises about respect for human life 
from fertilization that drive the anti-abortion movement.37 
 
 35 See Tamar Lewin, Falling for Years, Abortion Rate Levels Off, with More Choosing Medication 
Over Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A13 (explaining that surgical abortions have be-
come less popular among women, while medical abortions rose). 
 36 Stacey A Missmer et al., Analysis of Multiple-Cycle Data from Couples Undergoing In Vitro Fertili-
zation:  Methodologic Issues and Statistical Approaches, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGY 497 (2011); Caroline 
Ryan, More than 3m Babies Born from IVF, BBC NEWS (June 21, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/5101684.stm; see also Saswati Sunderam et al., As-
sisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance—United States, 2006, 58 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY 
WKLY. REP. 1, 5 (2009), available at  www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5805.pdf (reporting on 
the growth of ART procedures among women worldwide). 
 37 It also figured into Justice O’Connor’s dissent in City of Akron, in which she notes that 
technology may be on a collision course with itself, in this case at the earliest stages rather 
than the later ones of viability that have drawn the most attention.  See City of Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456–57 (1983) (explaining that im-
provements in technology will move forward the point at which the state may constitu-
tionally regulate abortions for maternal health reasons while other advances will move 
back the point of viability). 
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III.  TECHNOLOGICAL DREAMING AS A FIX TO THE ABORTION DEBATE 
Both sides continue to draw on technological change as a poten-
tial fix to some if not all of the moral and legal controversies over 
abortion.  The hope for a technological solution continually reap-
pears, as we will see with technologies of fetal visualization, neonatol-
ogy, fetal pain, and prenatal diagnosis discussed below.  Each side 
wants to draw on technology to increase or to limit abortion rights.  
The practicalities and politics of the controversy thus morph and 
change as new technologies come online and open new opportuni-
ties for proponents to expand the meaning of the right and for op-
ponents to challenge it. 
One dream of technology is that it could cut through the heated 
battles of the last thirty-eight years to a more politically acceptable so-
lution.  But this dream is a chimera.  The reality is that new technolo-
gies usually harden each side into its prevailing ideology.  Yet, as I will 
argue, focusing on technological changes in abortion is not always a 
fruitless enterprise, and it might in some instances usefully deepen 
and extend the understanding of abortion rights and may even lead 
to change and evolution in those doctrines. 
Anti-abortionists have drawn on medical and scientific knowledge 
to maintain that the fertilized egg, zygote, blastocyst, and fetus are 
each a new human individual and they therefore have all the rights of 
other individuals.  By establishing those medical facts, they thought 
that it would make clear once and for all that there was a whole new 
individual here, which itself would resolve the legal debate.  But it 
soon became clear that establishing the unique individuality of the 
fertilized egg was a medical or scientific fact and, as such, it could not 
sidestep the value judgment and analysis that was at the heart of the 
moral and constitutional debate.38 
The South Dakota informed consent law at issue in South Dakota v. 
Rounds illustrates the role, which the claim that the fetus is a “whole, 
separate, unique human being” plays for anti-abortionists within the 
ground rules set up by Casey.39  The state was able to persuade the 
Eighth Circuit that requiring women to be so informed is simply a 
statement of scientific fact and thus is permissible.40  The court sides-
 
 38 See generally Judith J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971) (de-
fending abortion on philosophical grounds). 
 39 Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(allowing a law that requires that doctors provide women seeking abortions with ideolog-
ically charged information, including that they will be terminating a human life, to take 
effect). 
 40 Id. at 736–38. 
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tepped the ideological content of the requirement by relying on 
another section of the statute that defined “human being” as a “living 
member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human 
being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to 
full gestation.”41  Since that is a biologically accurate statement, and 
could be as relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion as 
the gestational age of the fetus, the court found that it was not ideo-
logical and therefore constitutional.42  That out may not be available 
in other situations. 
The urge for a technological solution is also evident in the hope, 
exemplified in Senator Graham’s confirmation exchange with then-
Solicitor General Elena Kagan, that technological advances pushing 
back viability will affect lines drawn for when abortion may be 
banned.43  Justice O’Connor’s own important insight in City of Akron 
about the trimester framework being on a collision course with itself 
also reflected a role for technology in demolishing the trimester ap-
proach, which happened nine years later in Casey.44 
Forcing women to view or listen to a description of a sonogram is 
also an example of technological dreaming.  Behind the anti-
abortion enchantment with sonograms is the idea that if a woman 
would just look and see what is there, she will see that it is a little tiny 
baby and will be incapable of killing it.  Similarly, if fetuses at twenty 
weeks have the neurological apparatus to feel pain, surely they have 
independent legal and moral standing and cannot be sacrificed by a 
pregnant woman.  The partial birth abortion controversy also relied 
on descriptions of actual abortion procedures to generate a moral re-
vulsion that led to a federal ban on the technique. 
Pro-choice groups also have their technological dreams.  They 
think that IVF technology and first trimester sonograms will show 
how rudimentary embryos and early fetuses are, thus putting the lie 
to the claim that there is an entity with independent moral status and 
 
 41 Id. at 727. 
 42 Because the plaintiffs’ experts had not addressed that additional part of the statutes, they 
had failed to demonstrate that the required disclosure of § 7(1)(b) is untruthful or mis-
leading or that it demonstrated an ideological message from which physicians could dis-
sociate themselves under the plaintiff’s First Amendment theory.  Id. at 736, n.9; see also 
id. at 738–41 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the South Dakota law focuses on ideo-
logical beliefs rather than medically relevant information); Robert Post, Informed Consent 
to Abortion:  A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
939, 941 (2007) (clarifying that the “obvious objective of the Act . . . is to use the concept 
of ‘informed consent’ to eliminate abortions”). 
 43 See LINDSEY GRAHAM, supra note 30. 
 44 Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
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rights from fertilization.  They also think that early abortion tech-
niques, such as manual vacuum aspirators or chemical abortions, will 
be more acceptable because they occur so early in the pregnancy and 
can be done in the privacy of an office practice.45  So will the accep-
tance of routine early noninvasive prenatal diagnosis by cell-free fetal 
genomic assemblies.  As more women are tested and more have abor-
tions, they hope that this technology will help ease acceptance of ear-
ly abortions, possibly even calling into question anti-abortion premis-
es in later abortions. 
But no new technology can close the distance between the under-
lying normative poles, or indeed, win much of the middle ground, of 
the moral, legal, and political conflict at the heart of the debate.  
Most technological change fits into the doctrinal and analytic catego-
ries laid down in Roe, Casey, and Gonzales.  Still, technological change 
is significant for presenting new angles on old issues, thus highlight-
ing the fetal status and procreative liberty arguments at the heart of 
the constitutional debate.  As I will explore here, by focusing the de-
bate even more closely on the legal and moral issues at stake, at some 
point technology might turn them inside out or at least push them to 
a new synthesis. 
At issue then in revisiting the recurring view that science and 
technology can solve or modulate the abortion debate is the role of 
science when normative questions are at issue.  As the naturalistic fal-
lacy teaches, however, no “ought” flows from an “is” and vice versa.  
Yet there is a way in which new facts reposition or at least force con-
frontation with the value judgments built on those facts.  Facts may be 
stubborn things, but they do not control or determine values.  They 
may, however, force reengagement with values and thus the underly-
ing meaning of the legal values and rights at issue.  Advances in neo-
natology, fetal pain capability, and very early prenatal diagnosis will 
not change the nodes of disagreement, but they force us to confront 
what is at stake in them, as new situations presenting those conflicts 
appear. 
 
 45 This is not inevitably the case, as IVF and development of RU486 for chemical abortion 
has shown.  Many had speculated that technologies that focus on first, early stages would 
be less controversial if no implantation had yet occurred or it was interrupted at a very 
early stage.  ROBERTSON, supra note 34, at 63–66.  But with RU486 and even post-coital 
contraception, the resistance has been just as great.  Few doctors do chemical abortions, 
and disputes have arisen in many states over whether pharmacists who object have a right 
not to fulfill prescriptions for either drug.  See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, Pharmacists Cannot 
Refuse Plan B Pill, Appeals Court Says, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2009, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/09/nation/na-pill-ruling9.  
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IV.  EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN ABORTION 
Roe and Casey approach abortion as a substantive due process li-
berty right.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sylvia Law, Reva Siegel, and others 
have criticized a liberty approach because it overlooks the impact of 
abortion laws on the equality and equal citizenship of women.46  
Equal citizenship concerns are now firmly situated in the plurality 
opinion in Casey and in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales, but the 
tension between a liberty and equality approach to abortion still ex-
ists.47  Much of this critique deals with access to abortion in the first 
and second trimesters and is less concerned with technology except 
as technological change limiting later abortions might affect those 
rights. 
A more paternalistic approach to abortion based on women’s in-
terests has also influenced the anti-abortion movement.  Reva Siegel 
has shown how the contemporary abortion restriction movement is 
split in its strategies, with one wing wanting to emphasize abortion 
bans as a way to protect women (incrementalists) and another wing 
continuing to emphasize the dignity and rights of fetuses per se 
(prohibitionists).48  Women-protective anti-abortion measures, which 
received recognition in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales, howev-
er, do conflict with Casey’s commitment to the dignity of women as 
independent decisionmakers about the role of reproduction in their 
 
 46 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 
63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (arguing that Roe is “weakened . . . by the opinion’s con-
centration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally 
based sex-equality perspective”); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984) (discussing modern constitutional sex equality and the issues 
that sex-based physical differences can raise in a “society committed to ideals of individual 
human freedom and equality of opportunity”); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:  A 
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
261, 264 (1992) (arguing that “regulation directed at women’s role in reproduction de-
mands exacting scrutiny to ensure it does not reflect or enforce traditional gender role 
assumptions”).  An equality perspective might have been more appealing to women and 
other supporters of abortion rights, but it would not have lessened any of the moral and 
constitutional conflict.  Anti-abortionists would still have preferred life of fetuses to the 
equality of women, and those leery of judicial invalidation of state legislation on Four-
teenth Amendment grounds would not have found equality a more convincing basis for 
invalidation of state abortion ban. 
 47 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 120, 171 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]t stake in 
cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s control over her [own] destiny.” (in-
ternal quotation mark omitted)); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 924 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a 
sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 48 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion Restrictions Under Ca-
sey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). 
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lives.49  Yet, as Siegel shows, government can “demonstrate respect for 
the dignity of human life so long as such regulation also demon-
strates respect for the dignity of women.”50  At some point women-
protective abortion restrictions violate or infringe a woman’s deci-
sional dignity protected by Casey, and so in the end must yield to it.  
Justice Kennedy’s adoption of women-protective rhetoric in Gonzales 
throws a toothy bone to anti-abortion activists, but in a showdown he 
would likely back the decisional dignity of women he so forcefully 
backed in Casey. 
What are the implications of technological changes in abortion 
for an equal citizenship approach?  Such an approach is central with 
regard to forced viewing of sonograms because that requirement op-
erates directly as a way to stop women from having abortions and im-
poses unnecessary distress in the process, thus interfering with their 
decisional autonomy and ability to function as equal citizens.  The 
equal citizenship approach is also important for determining when 
abortions may be banned in the second trimester on grounds of fetal 
pain or viability.  At those points the women-protective concerns of 
the sonogram and informed consent controversies are supplemented 
by concerns about the rights and dignity of fetuses, which also feed 
into women-protective concerns as the main point of conflict with a 
woman’s equal citizenship and decisional autonomy.51  Those tech-
nological developments become important to the extent that moral, 
policy, and constitutional decisions give them determinative value. 
The question of early prenatal selection at first blush seems less 
centrally involved with equal citizenship and more directly engaged 
with liberty.  Now the issue is not whether a woman may choose to 
end any pregnancy but whether she may choose to do so because of 
genetic or other traits of the fetus and prospective child.  Yes, women 
have a right to the reproductive decisional autonomy essential for 
 
 49 In situating the abortion debate within the woman’s rights movement Siegel shows how 
an anti-abortion position comes out of traditional attitudes of keeping women in their 
place by denying them freedom over their reproductive lives.  Id. at 1773–80.  Kristin 
Luker’s Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood is the locus classicus of this position.  
See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984) (ar-
guing that the abortion debate reflects the conflict between the traditional female role of 
rearing children and the modern one of women as equal actors in work and civil aciti-
vies). 
 50 Siegel, supra note 48, at 1702. 
 51 Anti-abortionists argue, as they did successfully in Gonzales, 550 U.S at 159–60, with the 
particulars of partial birth abortion, that women need to be protected against ignorantly 
causing their fetuses pain, lest they live for the rest of their lives with the sorrow and pain 
that will surely result when they learn that they have allowed a doctor to kill their fetus in 
a painful way.  (I am indebted to Cary Franklin for clarification of this point.) 
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equal citizenship, but the question is whether being able to choose 
medical and nonmedical traits of offspring is such an important part 
of personal liberty that it is essential for equal citizenship.  If it is, 
then whether cast in liberty or equal citizenship terms, women will 
have the right to the tests and information needed to make abortion 
decisions on whatever basis they choose, including the genetic fea-
tures of fetuses. 
V.  WORDS AND IMAGES:  SONOGRAM TECHNOLOGY, INFORMED 
CONSENT, AND COMPELLED SPEECH 
Ultrasound is a standard tool of obstetrics and gynecology and 
used routinely to establish and date pregnancy both in abortion and 
non-abortion settings.  For anti-abortionists, sonograms are a tech-
nological fix for the uncertainty or ignorance that pregnant women 
might have concerning the fetus they are carrying, and hence the 
moral and emotional meaning of having an abortion.  They have 
been an anti-abortion cudgel since Silent Scream in 1984.52  Anti-
abortionists dream that sonogram technology will reduce the number 
of abortions by showing vividly the impact of what an abortion will do 
to a living fetus with a beating heart.53  Less tendentiously, it will also 
give women more complete information about their decision, making 
them better informed when they do decide.54 
Laws already exist in nineteen states that require that a woman, in 
addition to being informed of fetal gestational age, medical and psy-
chological risks of abortion, and child support and adoption alterna-
tives, be offered the chance to view an ultrasound of the fetus.55  
These laws appear to be constitutional—they inform the woman of 
the opportunity to get more information about the fetus if she 
chooses.  By leaving the choice to her, they respect her autonomy and 
 
 52 See SILENT SCREAM (American Portrait Films 1984), available at http://www.silentscream
.org/silentscream.html. 
 53 It is a bit like a vegetarian requiring that meat eaters see images of slaughterhouses or 
factory farming of hogs and chickens before purchasing meat. 
 54 Ultrasonography may also be important for nurses and doctors who are willing to do 
some early abortions to identify the lines of what they find acceptable.  Emily Bazelon 
gives several examples of how movement on ultrasound affects what residents, doctors, 
and nurses will accept participation in, say at nine or eleven or thirteen weeks, and 
whether they will do just chemical abortions.  Bazelon, supra note 25, at 37, 44. 
 55 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:  REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (2011), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf [hereinafter 
GUTTMACHER INST.]. 
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create no undue burden.56  Still, it is no secret that they are motivated 
by a sentiment that if women are reminded that the fetus can be seen 
on ultrasound and they choose to see it, they may hesitate in going 
forward with the abortion because of their “natural” maternal feel-
ings.57 
Oklahoma and Texas now require that women not only be in-
formed that a sonogram may be viewed, but also that the sonogram 
image be displayed in a manner so that the pregnant woman may 
view it and simultaneously receive “a verbal explanation of the results 
of the sonogram images, including a medical description of the di-
mensions of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and 
the presence of external and internal organs.”58 
Although the woman is not required to view the image, the doctor 
or sonographer must still provide a verbal description of anatomical 
features.  Indeed, Texas goes further and requires that she listen to 
the fetus’s heartbeat or a verbal description of it.59  In Oklahoma, the 
viewing/description of the sonogram must occur at least two hours 
before the abortion;60 in Texas, it must occur twenty-four hours be-
fore.61 
Pro-choice advocates argue that forced viewing/hearing laws are 
less about ensuring fully informed consent to abortion and more 
about forcing women to hear, in a particularly vivid way, the State’s 
normative position on fetal life.  They believe that mandated view-
ing/hearing will change few minds but will create more stress or an-
 
 56 Presumably having to put their choice for or against viewing the ultrasound in writing is 
not enough of a burden to make it “undue.” 
 57 As the Guttmacher Institute says about both mandatory offer and viewing of sonogram 
laws:  “Since routine ultrasound is not considered medically necessary as a component of 
first-trimester abortion, the requirements appear to be a veiled attempt to personify the 
fetus and dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion.”  GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 
55. 
 58 Informed Consent to an Abortion Act, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 73, H.B. No. 15 
§ 2(a)(4)(C).  There are exceptions for pregnancies due to sexual assault, incest, or 
where the fetus has “an irreversible medical condition or abnormality, as previously iden-
tified by reliable diagnostic procedures and documented in the woman’s medical file.”  
Id.  The Oklahoma law contains very similar language.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
738.3d (West Supp. 2011). 
 59 Informed Consent to an Abortion Act, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 73, H.B. No. 15 
§ 2(a)(4)(C). 
 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (stating that a sonogram must be provided at least 
one hour prior to having any part of an abortion performed or induced). 
 61 Informed Consent to an Abortion Act, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 73, H.B. No. 15 
§ 2(b) (West) (stating that in Texas the sonogram may be provided two hours in advance 
if the woman lives more than one hundred miles from an abortion facility). 
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noyance at a time that is already stressful.62  The key question, howev-
er, is whether mandated viewing/hearing fits within the information 
model of informed consent upheld in Casey.  If it does, it would also 
have to meet First Amendment standards for content-based com-
pelled speech. 
A. The Casey Standard 
To assess how these laws would fare under Casey, recall how Casey 
dealt with informed consent under its newly articulated undue bur-
den standard.  Casey addressed a Pennsylvania statute that required 
that the physician inform her patient about: 
[T]he nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of 
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child’ . . . [as 
well as] the availability of printed materials published by the State de-
scribing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for 
childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of 
agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to 
abortion.63 
Addressing the question under due process, the plurality in Casey 
jettisoned Roe’s trimester framework and asked instead whether the 
restrictions before it were an “undue burden.”64  That term was  
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus.  A statute with this purpose is invalid be-
cause the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential 
life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.65 
The plurality went on to say that the State could “further its legi-
timate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legisla-
tion aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even 
when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over 
abortion.”66  If so, “[r]egulations which do no more than create a 
 
 62 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:  Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected 
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (2008) (arguing that these measures are intended to en-
force the state’s position). 
 63 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992) (stating that an abor-
tion may not be performed unless the woman certifies in writing that she has been in-
formed of the availability of these printed materials and has been provided them if she 
chooses to view them). 
 64 See id. at 844–45 (explaining that in addition to informed consent, there were regulations 
concerning a twenty-four hour waiting period between consent and the abortion, spousal 
notice, parental notification, record-keeping, and emergency notification).  All regula-
tions except the spousal notice were upheld as not imposing an undue burden. 
 65 Id. at 877. 
 66 Id. at 883. 
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structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound 
respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a sub-
stantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”67 
B. The Validity of Forced Viewing/Hearing of Sonograms under Casey 
The Oklahoma and Texas requirements of viewing a sonogram or 
hearing an anatomical description of the fetus extends beyond the 
Pennsylvania requirement upheld in Casey of describing the “proba-
ble gestational age of the unborn child” as well as the availability of 
state provided printed materials describing the fetus.68  Is the more 
robust requirement of requiring that the woman view or hear a de-
scription an undue burden on the new standard articulated in Casey?  
This depends on whether the purpose or effect of the law is to place 
“a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”69  
If the laws do not create an undue burden and are not impermissibly 
vague, they may still raise First Amendment problems.70  Validity, 
however, under the Casey standard will go a long way toward resolving 
other plaintiff arguments, such as claims that such laws violate medi-
cal ethics, compel government speech, or discriminate against wom-
en. 
1.  Purpose 
The undue burden test is one of both purpose and effect.  Few 
would doubt that the purpose of those backing the sonogram law is 
to reduce the number of abortions.  But it is a purpose they seek to 
accomplish by giving the woman more complete factual information 
about the gestational status of the fetus at or shortly before the abor-
tion occurs.  The ultimate purpose—reducing abortions—is accom-
plished by the proximate purpose of giving more specific information 
about her particular fetus, thus arguably fitting within the Casey mod-
el of a more informed and autonomous choice on her part.71 
 
 67 Id. at 877.  
 68 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West). 
 69 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 70 Both the Oklahoma and Texas challenges stress heavily the lack of specificity in what the 
laws require a physician to tell the patient.  See Nova Health Systems v. Edmondson, No. 
CV-2010-533, (Okla. D. Ct. filed Apr. 27, 2010). 
 71 See Susan Donaldson James, Oklahoma Abortion Law:  No Exceptions, Even Rape, ABC NEWS 
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/okla-abortion-law-exceptions-rape/
story?id=10507849&singlePage=true (“[F]ellow lawmakers hoped it would curtail abor-
tions in the state . . . [by] allowing her to have informed consent prior to an abortion.”); 
see also id. (“Unfortunately in Oklahoma, we have encountered a lot of women who, by 
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Oklahoma and Texas law, however, already require that a preg-
nant woman be given information about the fetus’s gestational stage 
of development in a prior conversation with the doctor.72  Neverthe-
less, anti-abortion legislators might still sincerely believe that there is 
a meaningful difference between a general account of gestational age 
and seeing an actual sonogram of the fetus within her and/or hear-
ing a verbal description of its anatomy.  For most women such more 
specific and vivid information may make no difference or simply 
cause them distress, but that possibility does not negate a legislative 
purpose to ensure that a sonogram image and/or oral anatomical de-
scription will make women more informed.73 
2.  Effects 
This part of the undue burden test questions whether the effect of 
the sonogram requirement is to create a “substantial obstacle to the 
woman's exercise of the right to choose.”74  Logistical and psychologi-
cal burdens need to be distinguished.  The Oklahoma and Texas laws 
do create logistical problems in requiring that the doctor who will do 
the abortion provide the sonogram and description two or twenty-
four hours before the abortion, respectively.75  This creates schedul-
ing problems and may require more physician time, thus increasing 
the costs or price of the abortion.  But it is unlikely that these costs 
are so much greater that they will pose “a substantial obstacle” to 
access.76  This is true even if it requires two trips for the woman, be-
 
the time the ultrasound is provided, they were already asleep and didn’t know . . . . The 
real purpose is to give patients all the information that is relevant before they make a life-
altering decision.”). 
 72 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 73, H.B. No. 15 § 2(a) (West) (stating all the information 
and materials that the physician must inform the patient of prior to the abortion).  In Ok-
lahoma the doctor is already required twenty-four hours prior to the abortion to read to 
the woman in person or over the telephone a prescribed script, describing the risks and 
complications of the procedure and gestational age.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.2 
(West 2011). 
 73 See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club Pac v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2830 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (showing that a similar conclusion is drawn in First 
Amendment law, where a law burdening free speech that has both a permissible and im-
permissible purpose is constitutional if the permissible purpose alone would justify the 
restriction on speech). 
 74 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 75 Both states allow a certified sonographer to do the ultrasound, but their standards for 
certification are extremely narrow and do not include nurses who have been trained in 
sonography.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.2 (West 2011); 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 
ch. 73, H.B. No. 15 § 2(a) (West). 
 76 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.  The Oklahoma two-hour sonogram law makes it harder to sche-
dule and process patients because the abortion provider must meet with or talk to them 
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cause the Supreme Court in Casey has already upheld the two visits 
that a twenty-four hour wait between informed consent and the abor-
tion entails. 
If scheduling inefficiencies and additional costs are constitutional-
ly acceptable, then it is unlikely that the sonogram viewing/hearing 
requirement itself will be found to constitute an obstacle that pre-
vents women from having an abortion.  The limited data available 
shows that few women change their minds because of the opportunity 
to view an ultrasound (having the image displayed and having to lis-
ten to a verbal description of anatomical features is a different mat-
ter).  One study in British Columbia found that 29% of patients 
wanted to see an image if offered a chance and that 83% of 254 
women who choose to view ultrasounds in a supportive environment 
said it did not make the experience more difficult, with none revers-
ing their decision.77 
Alabama, which enacted a law offering ultrasound images in 2002, 
found that half of women opted to look at the image, but it changed 
almost none of their minds.  Most women who chose not to view said 
that they did not want to subject themselves to images that might 
haunt them.  However, some women who viewed the image found the 
sonogram to be reassuring because at nine or ten weeks human fea-
tures were barely detectable.78  The Alabama law had no apparent ef-
fect on the number of abortions (about 11,300 per year).  In the few 
cases where it did change a woman’s mind, it was because the sono-
gram revealed a multiple pregnancy or when the woman was already 
deeply troubled about the abortion. 
The question of burden when viewing/hearing the ultrasound is 
mandatory is another matter.  Anecdotal evidence from a Tulsa abor-
tion clinic that successfully obtained a temporary injunction against 
enforcement of the Oklahoma law claimed that the law had been up-
 
twice.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 63, § 1-738.2 (West 2004).  In Texas, the provider must meet 
with them at least twenty-four hours in advance unless certain exceptions apply or they 
live more than one hundred miles away from an abortion provider.  TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a), (b) (West 2010).  Even if these were unconstitutional, it 
would be feasible to impose the same requirement of viewing/listening with a different 
doctor or sonographer providing the information. 
 77 Ellen R. Wiebe & Lisa C. Adams, Women’s Experience of Viewing the Products of Conception Af-
ter an Abortion, 80 CONTRACEPTION 575 (2009); see also A.A. Bamigboye et al., Should Wom-
en View the Ultrasound Image Before First-Trimester Termination of Pregnancy?, 92 S. AFR. MED. J. 
430, 431 (2002) (showing that seeing an ultrasound did not make the decision to termi-
nate more difficult). 
 78 See Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has a New Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at 
A3 (discussing how one patient said, “It was really the picture of the ultrasound that made 
me feel it was O.K.”). 
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setting to the women who have been subjected to it.  In the six days 
the Oklahoma law was in effect, all the patients at a Tulsa clinic 
averted their eyes.79  The director of the clinic, which does 3000 abor-
tions a year, reported that “Not one patient would look at the screen 
and they all closed their eyes or turned their heads . . . But it’s hard 
to turn your ears off . . . Several of the patients were in tears after-
wards.  No one changed their mind.”80 
Indeed, if they do change their minds and do not go through with 
the abortion, this alone would not demonstrate that the law was an 
undue burden.  A decision not to have an abortion after the sono-
gram is consistent with the more complete informed consent the so-
nogram requirement aims to provide.  On the other hand, going 
ahead with the abortion shows that the requirement did not consti-
tute an obstacle, but it does not show that the woman was not bur-
dened by it.  She may be more distressed as a result of the sonogram 
viewing/description requirement, and annoyed that she has had to 
listen to the state-mandated anatomical description.  Even if she has 
not been distressed, she has still had to undergo a physical and audi-
tory experience that she preferred not to have.  It may not be a “sub-
stantial obstacle” to having an abortion, but it is still a burden that 
needs justification.81 
It may be that one goal of the law is to make it as hard as possible 
emotionally for the woman to go forward.  But a willingness to im-
pose unpleasant information on women contemplating abortion is 
not the same as a purpose to prevent them from exercising that right 
if that information is an inextricable part of a fully informed decision 
to abort.82  The weak link in this argument, however, is that forced 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 James, supra note 71.  The abortion clinic director said that the “law was ‘outrageous,’ 
particularly for traumatized rape and incest survivors.  It’s very painful for them . . . They 
are already a victim . . . Forcing women against their will causes even more pain and dis-
tress.” Id. 
 81 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club Pac v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2823 (2011) 
(“If the state made privately funded candidates pay a $500 fine to run as such, the fact 
that candidates might choose to pay it does not make the fine any less burdensome.”). 
 82 Might the state go even further, for example, by mandated viewing/description of an ac-
tual abortion, showing the dismemberment and ripping apart of the fetus that occurs af-
ter the first weeks?  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 136–40 (2006) (graphically 
describing dilation and evacuation, which seems every bit as offensive as intact dilation 
and evacuation, the partial birth abortion procedure at issue there).  Recall also Silent 
Scream’s image of the prodding and poking of a fetus by an instrument introduced into 
the uterus.  The Silent Scream, Script and Photos, THE SILENT SCREAM, 
http://www.silentscream.org/silent_e.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).  On the other 
hand, a lecture about the state’s position on when life begins so that women will more ful-
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viewing/description presents an image or an oral description, which 
is more specific, but no new facts are provided beyond about what 
state informed consent law already requires to be disclosed about ges-
tational development.  Despite the factual accuracy of sonograms and 
the greater specificity of the oral description, requiring the woman to 
view or listen to these when she has chosen not to have a sonogram 
has all the hallmarks of an ideological requirement.83 
Lower court judges may differ as to whether there is such an im-
portant increase in cognitive understanding that all women can be 
subjected to hearing the unwanted description when many will not 
want it and very few will change their minds as a result.  Some judges 
might say that the burden is not undue because the view-
ing/description is more specific and thus has made women more ful-
ly informed.  Other judges will find that requiring an unwanted ana-
tomical description is a burden that cannot be justified. 
Given the differing views about abortion among current Supreme 
Court Justices, a decision to uphold precisely drawn versions of 
forced viewing/hearing sonogram laws will likely depend on Justice 
Kennedy’s view.  He was insistent in Gonzales that partial birth abor-
tion techniques could be banned because women might not be told 
what exactly had been done to their fetus and be greatly upset if they 
later learn the details.84  On this theory, Kennedy could find that 
women have not been fully informed unless they have seen an image 
or heard a description of the fetus as part of informed consent twen-
ty-four hours before the abortion. 
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy might also find that it is an 
indignity to women.  After all, those seeking an abortion have been 
told “the probable gestational age of the unborn child,” presented 
with additional printed materials, and then been given the opportu-
nity to have an ultrasound.  If they must also then have an ultrasound 
done, sometimes vaginally, be subjected to a verbal description of fet-
al features, and hear or have its heartbeat described, he might agree 
that these requirements go beyond simply making consent more in-
formed.  Although all this information is factual, providing it in this 
way becomes ideological because it assumes that women cannot de-
 
ly understand the “evil” of what they will be doing is less factual than an ultrasound image 
and thus more likely to be found unconstitutional as ideological. 
 83 See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 55, at 1; Sanger, supra note 62, at 396 (“[A] woman 
seeing or being offered the sight of her own unseen fetus for the first time is being forced 
into something like a religious or sacred moment.”). 
 84 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159–60 (arguing that learning the details of the medical proce-
dure conducted on the fetus will cause the mother to feel “grief more anguished and sor-
row more profound”). 
354 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:2 
 
cide on their own how much information they want, in effect trying 
to ensure an outcome or simply make it more difficult for women. 
3.  First Amendment and Other Claims 
Meeting Casey’s undue burden, however, alone may not suffice to 
validate fetal sonogram laws.  Such laws are also subject to attack 
based on a First Amendment right against compelled speech.85  The 
Casey plurality dealt with a First Amendment objection to mandatory 
informed consent only summarily.  As it noted at the end of its opi-
nion in Casey: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment 
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abor-
tion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State.  To be sure, the 
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only 
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State.  We see no constitutional infirmity in the re-
quirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the 
State here.86 
Since Pennsylvania had required that the risks, benefits, and al-
ternatives to the abortion be presented, including the “probable ges-
tational age of the unborn child,”87 and additional materials, the idea 
that this information could be required of physicians as part of licens-
ing and regulation of medicine raised no serious issue of compelled 
speech. 
The Texas (and Oklahoma) fetal sonogram statutes, however, re-
quire much more.88  In addition to the information required in the 
statute at issue in Casey, each state requires the physician to describe 
the anatomical features of the fetus and its heartbeat in cases in 
which the pregnant woman does not wish to view the sonogram or lis-
ten to the heartbeat.  For opponents of such laws, a First Amendment 
attack is stronger, for the government will have to satisfy a scrutiny 
stricter than that of undue burden.89 
 
 85 Arguments against sonogram laws based on medical ethics and sex discrimination are not 
discussed here.  If these laws are not invalid on undue burden or First Amendment 
grounds, these claims will not independently carry the day. 
 86 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 550 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 87 Id. at 902. 
 88 See supra note 72. 
 89 That standard will demand a showing of a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring, 
e.g., why existing informed consent requirements, such as notice of the availability of ul-
trasound imaging and materials that describe the probable anatomical and physiological 
characteristics of unborn child at two week-intervals, do not make the woman as well in-
formed.  See also Post, supra note 42 (arguing that First Amendment questions are raised 
when the state requires physicians to engage in ideological speech and when the state ei-
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As the district judge evaluating the plaintiff’s attack on the Texas 
sonogram statute put it, the government must prove that “the com-
pelled speech portions of the Act further a compelling governmental 
interest and are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”90  This is 
more demanding than the Casey standard which spoke about the re-
quired information provided to the woman be “important,” “substan-
tial,” and “legitimate,” but not compelling.91  Also, he noted that al-
lowing the state to require, as Casey did, that “[i]f the information the 
State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not 
misleading, the requirement may be permissible” was not carte 
blanche to force physicians to deliver and force women to consider 
whatever information the government deems appropriate, such as 
the more intrusive information of forced viewing/hearing of a sono-
gram when the woman has already been told of the probable gesta-
tional age.92 
To get the full flavor of the opponents First Amendment claim, 
recall that free speech attacks on disclosure requirements in the 
abortion debate had previously focused on information that had 
been contested on factual or ideological grounds.  The factual dis-
putes in prior debates had concerned whether women must be in-
formed that abortion carries risks of breast cancer, infertility, depres-
sion, and suicide.  Since the overwhelming consensus of medical 
evidence is that such information is not truthful, it should not be ac-
ceptable as part of informed consent under Casey.93  But a description 
of the anatomical features of the pregnant woman’s fetus is truthful, 
and thus not invalid on those grounds. 
Nor is it necessarily ideological as long as it is limited to an ana-
tomical image or factual description.  The ideological question was 
most squarely presented in Planned Parenthood v. Rounds.94  South Da-
kota had required that the doctor inform the woman orally and in 
writing “that the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
 
ther requires the physician to espouse information the medical community regards as 
false or prohibits them from communicating information regarded as the truth). 
 90 Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, at *42 
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2011); accord Stuart v. Huff. No. 1:11CV804 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 25, 
2011) (finding that mandating sonogram description to abortion patient violates provid-
er’s First Amendment rights). 
 91 Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–82. 
 92 Id. at 882. 
 93 See supra note 86. 
 94 Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
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unique living human being.”95  The Eighth Circuit rejected the claim 
that such a statement was ideological because the South Dakota sta-
tute had provided a biological definition of that term.96  Similarly, so-
nogram laws purport simply to present the facts.  Other than requir-
ing that the facts be presented, they themselves do not demand a 
normative evaluation of those facts.  The sonogram is a real-time true 
image of the fetus, and the anatomical description purports to de-
scribe biological facts.  There is no normative evaluation of the moral 
status of the fetus as such or description of it as “a living human indi-
vidual.”97 
Still, sonogram laws require physicians to deliver government 
speech about a factual matter that many patients will consider un-
wanted, immaterial, and/or irrelevant.  Although the visual informa-
tion or verbal description presented is accurate, the argument is that 
pressing that information on those who do not want it becomes ideo-
logical when they have already been told about gestational age, have 
written materials available to them that provide essentially the same 
information, and say they want no further information.  The question 
is whether providing this additional information, though it is factually 
accurate, is “compelling” in that it will make women more informed 
than simply telling them the probable gestational age and providing 
materials or the ability to view the image if they wish. 
Framed in First Amendment terms, it will be easier for strong de-
fenders of First Amendment rights, such as Justice Kennedy, to find 
that these statutes are invalid, even if they are not invalid under the 
Casey undue burden standard.98  It will be difficult for the government 
to show that the requirement will enhance informed consent beyond 
what is already acceptable under Casey.  In a free speech context it is 
all the more evident that the sonogram requirement is evaluative and 
hence ideological relative to the woman’s own social and economic 
needs and moral evaluation.99 
 
 95 Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Id. at 727–35. 
 97 Id. at 742–43. 
 98 To note only two of Justice Kennedy’s votes in favor of First Amendment rights, he was 
the key vote in both Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), and in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  These cases, however, involved the rights of corpora-
tions and business interests. 
 99 As my colleague Cary Franklin puts it, “[I]t’s one thing to see a picture; it’s another to see 
a picture in those circumstances, where the state is, through its behavior, making very 
clear its understanding of what you are seeing and of the kind of action you are contem-
plating.”  Interview with Cary C. Franklin, Professor of Law, Univ. of Tex. at Austin Sch. of 
Law (Jan. 19, 2011). 
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To summarize this discussion, sonogram technology is a central 
feature of abortion practice, essential for confirming and dating 
pregnancy.  Viewing and/or hearing a description of the sonogram 
may provide relevant information to women planning an abortion, 
but women already receive that information in a less vivid verbal or 
written form.  Forcing women to view the sonogram and listen to the 
heartbeat or hear a verbal account of anatomical details goes beyond 
informing them of the physical status of the fetus.  It advocates for 
the state’s preference for childbirth, and thus has all the hallmarks of 
an ideological requirement.  However, based on Casey’s delineation 
of the undue burden test and the factual accuracy of the sonogram 
image or description, many courts and the Supreme Court itself may 
permit states that choice.  If states do so, they will still have to con-
front a First Amendment claim against compelled speech that does 
not serve a compelling interest in a narrowly tailored way.  Even if 
Justice Kennedy votes with the government on both the due process 
and First Amendment point, forced viewing/hearing of a sonogram 
or fetal heartbeat is unlikely to have an appreciable effect on the de-
cision of most women to have an abortion. 
VI.  ABORTION BANS AT TWENTY WEEKS:  FETAL VIABILITY AND FETAL 
PAIN 
With “viability” as the outer limit of the core right to terminate 
pregnancy, technological developments in neonatalogy and the survi-
vability of very premature newborns has played a key role in the abor-
tion debate.  More precise knowledge of how the fetal neurological 
system develops and thus when fetuses become sentient may provide 
an additional reason for limiting abortions in the vicinity of viability.  
Nebraska has now raised this issue by banning abortions after twenty 
weeks on the ground that fetuses are then “pain-capable.”100  This is a 
direct challenge to the later line based on viability (roughly twenty-
four weeks but creeping backwards) that has held sway since Roe and 
Casey.101 
 
100 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,106 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (banning abortions at twen-
ty weeks gestation, with exceptions only when the woman’s life is at risk, to prevent “[a] 
serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily func-
tion,” or where it is necessary to terminate one fetus to save another, but excludes mental 
health, including prevention of suicide). 
101 The Supreme Court has consistently held that bans after viability must make an exception 
for when an abortion “is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation 
of the life or health of the woman.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).  It has long 
emphasized that psychological health is a component of woman’s health.  See Gonzales v. 
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Under existing precedents, the Nebraska law is almost certain to 
be struck down both because it conflicts directly with these cases and 
because of its very narrow exception for the life and health of the 
woman.102  In addition, its claim of pain-capability at twenty weeks and 
other developments in neonatology focus attention once again on 
the viability line and its justification.  With further technological de-
velopments, the Court might eventually have to rethink the basis for 
drawing the line at viability, either reaffirming it or cutting into a 
woman’s ability to get an abortion late in the second trimester of 
pregnancy.103  Although not affecting the 90% of abortions that occur 
by the sixteenth week of pregnancy, the line is important for those 
who do not have that earlier opportunity, for example, those who 
learn of a fetal anomaly late in pregnancy as well as those who are not 
able to get access to abortion services earlier.  It will also clarify the 
constitutional basis for abortion and by implication the reasoning 
that supports early abortion. 
Before turning to issues of fetal pain and sentience and whether, 
if that physiologic basis for fetal pain is established,  it provides an 
earlier and independent ground than viability for banning abortion, I 
first review the problematics of the Supreme Court’s position on via-
bility and its precedents implementing that standard.104  The Court’s 
clumsy handling of viability makes it dubious that earlier survivability 
alone will change the outer limit on when abortion may occur.  Simi-
lar problems arise if neurologic evidence of fetal sentience is estab-
lished at twenty weeks. 
 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the constitutionality of Congress’s Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(upholding the essential holding of Roe, but introducing the “undue burden” standard as 
another factor to be considered by the courts); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (holding that the 
state has a legitimate interest in the unborn fetus at the point of viability outside of the 
womb); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (holding that the District of Colum-
bia’s ban on abortions, except when necessary to preserve the mother’s life or health, was 
not unconstitutionally vague). 
102 See supra note 100. 
103 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming that the trimester framework of Roe was on a colli-
sion course with itself as the time of viability moved backwards closer to conception, the 
maintenance of embryos outside of the body moved forward, and protection of women’s 
health moved later in pregnancy toward childbirth). 
104 All references to viability, fetal sentience, or other substantive grounds assume that those 
limits do not apply if the woman’s life or health is at risk.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. 
Dec. 2011] ABORTION & TECHNOLOGY 359 
 
A. The Problematics of Viability 
For more than thirty-seven years the Court has held that the Con-
stitution bars a state from banning abortion prior to the point in 
pregnancy when a fetus is viable.105  It has also held that “viability” is 
necessarily a “flexibl[e] . . . term,” and that states cannot “place viabil-
ity, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the 
gestation period.”106  Moreover, because “[t]he time when viability is 
achieved may vary with each pregnancy,” the determination of viabili-
ty must be left to the physician’s judgment.107 
While existing precedent is clear and the line might be justified, 
the Court has never given a convincing account of why viability is key, 
thus contributing yet another reason for critics to question the validi-
ty of its rulings.  There is an intuitive appeal in choosing a point 
roughly two thirds through a normal pregnancy to say “no” to abor-
tions (except to protect the life and health of the woman), which is 
later than almost any country in Europe permits.  But attempts to 
provide that justification are quickly wrapped in paradox and contra-
diction.  The Court in Roe simply said: 
With respect to the . . . interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is 
at viability.  This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capabili-
ty of meaningful life outside of the womb.  State regulation protective of 
fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.108 
As John Hart Ely so eloquently noted, the Court “seems to mistake 
a definition for a syllogism.”109  It simply repeated what “viability” 
means—“presumably . . . the capacity of meaningful life outside the 
mother’s womb.”110  But this definition is not an argument for why 
 
105 E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. 
106 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976). 
107 Id. at 64; accord Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 492–93 (1989) (holding 
that the determination of viability is a matter for the judgment of the attending physi-
cian); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388–89 (1979) (“Viability is reached when, in the 
judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the womb, with or with-
out artificial support.  Because this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the leg-
islature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment 
of viability—be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor—as the de-
terminant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus.  
Viability is the critical point.”). 
108 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
109 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 
(1973). 
110 Id. at 924 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 163) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As previous-
ly noted, the court in Colautti spoke of “a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained sur-
vival outside of the womb.”  439 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).  Arguably this is broader 
than the “meaningful life outside the . . . womb” of Roe, with its suggestion that mere exis-
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survivability should matter, nor are “logical and biological justifica-
tions” for using viability as the cutoff point so easily discerned.  Much 
more needs to be said to persuade that drawing the outer limits of 
abortion at ex utero survivability is constitutionally justified.  It was yet 
another reason why the Court’s opinion struck so many as an ipse di-
xit, not founded in any valid conception of constitutional law.111 
1. Logical Justification 
One logical inconsistency is that if the fetus at viability could have 
“meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” why would that not be 
a time when abortion could occur as long as the method used (pros-
taglandin induction of labor or even hysterotomy) allowed the fetus 
to survive?112  Now in fact deliberately inducing a premature birth at 
twenty-four weeks or later in pregnancy is not as desirable for the 
newborn as staying in the womb as long as possible, though even that 
changes after thirty or thirty-two weeks.  If so, at and after viability a 
woman should be able to terminate the pregnancy, albeit with a 
technique that does not kill the fetus, and then relinquish parental 
rights if she is not interested in rearing a child. 
If that logic is not appealing, it is because of the poor outcomes 
that very premature newborns have, particularly at twenty-four to 
twenty-six weeks or earlier.  True, some of them may survive, but the 
earlier the birth the lower the number and the greater extent of long 
stays in NICUs, physical and mental impairment, and the like.113  Yes, 
 
tence without some sort of “meaningful[ness]” for the infant is not required, as long as 
survival for some indefinite period—”sustained”—is established.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 
(emphasis added).  Would this mean survival for several weeks or months or even years?  
This raises questions of when treatment can be stopped on very premature newborns.  See 
infra note 113 and accompanying text.  As technology extends survivability earlier, it rais-
es the issue of what is the basis for valuing life inside the womb when outside it the par-
ents and doctors may no longer choose or be obligated to sustain it. 
111 Stronger criticisms of the Court’s lack of argument in Roe applied first to its finding that 
the right of privacy in Griswold included a right to terminate a pregnancy and second to 
its conclusion that the states had no power to value the fetus even if they were not obli-
gated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “personhood” clause to do so.  Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
112 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
113 American Heart Association, 2005 American Heart Association (AHA) Guidelines For Cardi-
opulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiovascular Care (ECC) of Pediatric and Neo-
natal Patients:  Neonatal Resuscitation Guidelines, 117 PEDIATRICS 1029 (2006), available at 
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/117/5/e1029.full.pdf+html; James A. 
Lemons et al., Very Low Birth Weight Outcomes of the National Institute of Child Health and 
Human Development Neonatal Research Network, January 1995 through December 1996, 107 
PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2001), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/107/1/e1.full.html; Jon E. Tyson et al., Intensive Care for Extreme Prematurity—
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they can survive, and can even have a “meaningful life,” broadly con-
strued.  But it hardly seems ideal and would lead us to question the 
intention or responsibility of parents who would induce a very prema-
ture birth and then rear the child, unless that were medically neces-
sary to ensure that the child would survive at all.  If they are intent on 
not parenting, then they might—under the stated logic of the viabili-
ty line—do so by terminating without killing and having others rear.  
Yes, it seems callous, but rights are rights. 
But if survival at twenty-four to twenty-six weeks or earlier is too 
fraught with physical and mental difficulties, then why is that point 
one at which there is “presumably . . . the capability of meaningful 
life outside the mother’s womb?”114  If that life is not meaningful 
enough because of the risks of prematurity, then why is it sufficient to 
limit a woman’s liberty to terminate a pregnancy in a non-lethal or 
even lethal manner? 
At this point the discussion must take account of a related body of 
ethics, law, and practice concerning parental decisionmaking with 
regard to very premature or handicapped newborns, with wider dis-
cretion for decisions about very premature and compromised infants.  
This area has a long history, and has led to less parental discretion 
over medical and surgical decisionmaking in the case of children who 
are born with Down syndrome and other anomalies.  This dilemma 
gave rise to the Baby Doe controversy of the earlier 1980s and the 
recognition that more had to be done to protect the well-being of 
disabled newborns once in the world.115 
As that debate has subsided, parental discretion over aggressive 
treatment has moved to the borders of extreme prematurity.  The 
one area where parental discretion is more widely recognized is with 
how aggressively to treat very premature newborns, say at twenty-four 
weeks or earlier.  Some centers will adhere to the parents’ wishes 
stated before birth and not have a neonatologist present at birth who 
can immediately resuscitate a very premature newborn.  Others will 
resuscitate but then allow parents to stop treatment at a later point.  
There is great variability in state law on precisely where discretion 
 
Moving Beyond Gestational Age, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1672 (2008); Nicholas S. Wood et al., 
Neurologic and Developmental Disability After Extremely Preterm Birth, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 378 
(2000), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJM200008103430601. 
114 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
115 See Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 647 (1986) (holding that regulations for in-
fant care review committees and other procedures for protection of seriously ill newborns 
were improperly promulgated); see also Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (2006)). 
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lies, as the Sidney Miller case from Texas shows.116  It does mean, 
however, that parents might be able to stop treatment or aggressive 
action once the twenty-two to twenty-four week fetus is outside of the 
womb.  Laws that limited abortions on grounds of earlier viability 
(survivability) might prevent women from ending pregnancies at an 
earlier time; they would not by themselves require aggressive treat-
ment once a very premature child is born.  At that point, unless state 
law required otherwise, parents could withdraw further treatment. 
2. Biological Justification 
So if “capability of meaningful life outside of the womb” has logi-
cal problems, what then about “the biological logic” that at viability—
twenty-four weeks (or even earlier)—the abortion should be imper-
missible?  Although the Court said nothing more about the biological 
justification of survivability ex utero, one can construct a justification 
based on the arguably less personal or religious view of fetal moral 
status when it is anchored in the physiological development necessary 
for survival tout court.  Opposing abortion before the physiological mi-
lestones that appear around twenty-two to twenty-four weeks seems to 
reflect a more subjective personal religious/moral view of the fetus, 
over which people have widely divergent views. 
As the fetus grows and develops, more physiologically based 
grounds for valuing it emerge which moves beyond the purely per-
sonal/religious and moral stance that characterizes views of fetal 
moral status earlier in pregnancy, and which made the state’s earlier 
choice of protection constitutionally fraught.  At this later point the 
fetus is so well developed that a state judgment that protects its life 
moves beyond the purely moral/religious/personal judgment not 
shared by all to a more objective basis in physical and neurological 
development.117  Justice Blackmun was right that a constitutional law 
could not resolve what so many other experts disagreed about if his 
well-intended but highly tendentious statement was read as applying 
to earlier stages of pregnancy.118  But the Constitution might allow the 
 
116 There is a vast literature here.  See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Extreme Prematurity and Parental 
Rights After Baby Doe, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32 (2004) (discussing the Child Abuse 
Amendments of 1984 and the need for better decision-making with regards to premature 
babies). 
117 Laurence Tribe makes an argument along these lines in Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword:  
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1973). 
118 Roe, 410 US. at 159–60, 162 (“We need not resolve the difficult question of when life be-
gins.  When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and the-
ology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development 
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state to do so at a later stage of development, say roughly at viability, 
when the fetus was so well-developed physically that protecting it 
sounded less like a personal religious/moral view of fetal status and 
one that was more widely shared based on the physical and neurolog-
ical development necessary for survival.119  At that point the fetus 
would be valued not merely for its potential but because of what it al-
ready is, and thus might be protected in what it is now more likely to 
become.  A state that took such a view was being less arbitrary and 
subjective than taking such a view earlier on before the physiological 
developments coincident with viability had occurred. 
Again, the problem was that the Court never stated this reason.  It 
simply asserted the definition of viability without giving reasons why 
viability, when the fetus is inside the uterus, should matter.  But it did 
strike an intuitive chord with many people, even among abortion lib-
erals.  Some version of developmental line, if not exactly viability, ex-
ists in almost all countries that recognize abortion—at some point the 
fetus which at an earlier stage was too undeveloped to be protected as 
such magically passed over into a new developmental stage.  In the 
United States viability did not mean that the fetus then was a constitu-
tional person whom the state had a duty to protect.  Rather it meant 
that the state could choose to protect it by banning abortion, subject 
to the life and health needs of the mother.  Most states eventually did 
so.  Indeed, some twenty to thirty states have brought within their 
homicide laws the actions of a person who in non-abortion settings 
causes the death in utero of a viable fetus.120  Texas, Minnesota, and a 
few other states extend that homicide prohibition to any stage of de-
velopment after fertilization.121 
 
of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.  It should be suffi-
cient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult 
question . . .  [T]he unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
whole sense.”). 
119 There is still the problem, however, that survivability per se would not necessarily mean 
“meaningful life” in a more qualitative sense, since many surviving very premature new-
borns would likely have severe physical and mental impairments. 
120 See, e.g., TEXAS PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(26); 19.01; 19.02(b); 19.06 (West 2011). Usually 
they do so by changing the common law or previous state definition of individual within 
state homicide law to cover viable fetuses, or in some cases, embryos and fetuses from fer-
tilization.  Such fetal protection statutes do not extend to lawful abortions. 
121 They are careful, however, to limit this protection to criminal law settings and not require 
that it be followed consistently throughout the many other contexts which personhood 
from fertilization or even viability would require in state law, for example, representation 
of seats in the legislature, tax and census obligations and the like.  See e.g., TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (West 1994); 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (West 2003). 
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One possible account for why this “biological justification” has 
had appeal has been the probability that at twenty-four weeks the fe-
tus, in addition to survivability, also has the capability to feel pain.  
The fetal neurological system seems well-enough developed at that 
point to be pain-capable, even if that capability is not convincingly es-
tablished for most experts until twenty-eight weeks or later.  The sub-
jective experience of fetal pain is hard to gauge because the fetus 
cannot speak, PET scans are not available, and the like.  But after fet-
al demise neuroscientists may be able to determine whether the brain 
structures essential to sentience exist, and at what stages of develop-
ment they have emerged.  Much more research needs to be done, in-
cluding when pain is experienced, whether consciousness is necessary 
for pain, when a fetal is conscious, and the like. 
If so, Nebraska’s ban on abortion after twenty weeks might seem 
to have some validity unless sentience must also be coupled with sur-
vivability to provide the compelling state interest needed to limit 
abortions.122  If the fetus at twenty weeks can feel pain but otherwise 
lacks the survivability status to bar termination, its possible sentience 
requires only that any abortion method occur with painkillers admi-
nistered first, so that the termination by dilation and extraction or 
evacuation (whole or piecemeal dismemberment) would occur with-
out pain.  Feeling pain itself would not confer rights under the viabil-
ity standard if fetuses are still not viable in the sense of being able to 
survive outside of the uterus.123  But it does force us to confront which 
ground supports the viability line.  If the “logical justification” found-
ers under the weight of parental discretion in NICUs, then why 
should possible sentience count for more if reasonable survival is still 
not possible and the pain associated with abortion can be quelled 
with painkillers prior to the procedure?124 
So technological advances in the survivability of twenty to twenty-
four week fetuses will provide no easy technological solution to the 
outer limits of the abortion right.  Instead, they force proponents to 
confront and develop further the normative and constitutional pre-
 
122 There is a parallel with a point, which Justice Kennedy used against pro-choice groups in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  If partial birth abortion were essential to a wom-
an’s health, her doctors could first inject the fetus with a drug that would kill it in utero, 
and then extract it by the intact dilation and extraction that was illegal if done on a live 
fetus.  In making that point he ignored the arguments that killing the fetus in utero first 
had its own medical risks for the woman.  Id. at 158, 160–63. 
123 The fact that non-human animals are sentient and feel pain leads to laws against animal 
cruelty but does not support bans on animal euthanasia, killing for food, in hunting, or in 
animal experimentation. 
124 See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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mises for that line.  Why does survivability matter, especially if the 
parents are not obligated to treat the child or if the child will survive 
with major anomalies?  Why should fetal sentience make any differ-
ence if the fetus is still in utero, is not viable, and can be terminated 
without pain?  What is the basis for when the state may value the fetus 
as such over the woman’s interest in ending such a pregnancy?  
Technology developments will not resolve the normative and legal is-
sues that arise here, but they will clarify or advance doctrinal devel-
opment as legislatures and courts grapple with their implications. 
B. Fetal Pain as a Basis for Banning Abortion 
Nebraska’s claim that a fetus is “pain-capable” at twenty weeks 
provides a basis for banning abortions independent of viability un-
derstood as survivability.  At twenty weeks the fetus may not be able to 
survive outside the uterus, but may the state nevertheless protect it if 
it has the neurological apparatus to feel pain? 
Nebraska’s appeal to fetal pain as an independent ground to ban 
abortion is based on new knowledge of when the anatomical and 
neurological apparatus to experience pain first develop in fetuses.  
This approach grew out of studies in the mid-1980s that showed that 
premature newborns, who until then had not routinely been given 
anesthesia during surgical procedures, showed indicators of pain.  
This led to anesthesia being routinely administered to neonates un-
dergoing surgery.  It also led to studies claiming that at some point in 
the second trimester a fetus has the anatomical and neurological 
structures to experience pain, express stress hormones, and react be-
haviorally to adverse stimuli such as injection or dismemberment.  
Anesthesia during pediatric, neonatal, and prenatal surgery became 
routine.  It was also administered in some late second trimester abor-
tions and led to legislation requiring that women undergoing late 
second trimester abortions be told that the fetus could feel pain and 
that they could have an anesthetic administered if they chose.125   
There is, however, no scientific or medical consensus that a fetus 
becomes pain-capable before twenty-four to forty-eight weeks at the 
earliest.  K.J.S. Anand thinks that fetuses may experience pain based 
on subsensory cortical and thalamic structures that develop before 
twenty weeks, which is earlier than the development at twenty-four 
weeks or later of the adult cortex thought necessary to experience 
 
125 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-3e (2010) (requiring notification to the patient of the availability 
of anesthetic treatment to prevent pain to the fetus); L.B. 1103, 101st Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 
2010). 
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pain.126  A Commission of Inquiry into Fetal Sentience in the House 
of Lords in England found that there may be “‘some form of pain 
sensation or suffering’ when the cortex has begun forming connec-
tions with the nerves that transmit pain signals,” which is not until 
twenty-six weeks or later.127  The Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists also determined that “‘a fetus can only feel pain after 
nerve connections become established between two parts of its brain:  
the cortex and the thalamus.’”  As a result, the group found that “‘lit-
tle sensory input’ reaches the brain of the developing fetus before 26 
weeks[,] ‘[t]herefore reactions to noxious stimuli cannot be inter-
preted as feeling or perceiving pain.’”128  A meta-study of fetal pain 
studies concluded that a fetus’s neurological pathways that allow for 
the “conscious perception of pain” do not function until after twenty-
eight weeks gestation.129  Professor Anand criticized this review on 
methodological and substantive grounds, including its failure to rec-
ognize the role of a subsensory cortex basis for feeling pain.130  The 
uncertainty about adequate cortical and neurological structure is 
compounded by different interpretations of the meaning of reaction 
to external stimuli and the effect of hormonal surges.  In the end, 
pain is a subjective experience.  Without someone telling us that they 
are experiencing pain we must rely on surrogate markers, some of 
which are reliable and others not. 
The immediate policy response to these studies has focused on 
the informed consent process.  Laws in several states were passed re-
quiring that women undergoing second trimester abortions be told 
that fetuses might experience pain and that they could have anesthe-
sia delivered to the fetus before or during the procedure.131  A bill in-
 
126 Pain of the Unborn:  Hearing before the Subcomm. on the  Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 109th Cong. 7–13 (2005) [hereinafter Unborn Pain Hearings] (statement of Dr. 
K.J.S. Anand). 
127 Id. at 26 (statement of Dr. Arthur L. Caplan). 
128 Id. (citing Professor Maria Fitzgerald of University College London and noting that W.G. 
Derbyshire concurred in an article in the BULL. OF THE AM. PAIN SOC’Y, August, 2003). 
129 Susan Lee et al., Fetal Pain:  A Systematic Multipdisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 947, 952 (2005). 
130 See Unborn Pain Hearings, supra note 126, at 13 (“[There is a] high likelihood of fetal 
pain perception before the third trimester of human gestation . . . [based on] thalamo-
cortical interactions located in the subplate zone that persist into maturity, thus providing 
a functional template for subsequent cortical processing.  Several lines of evidence indi-
cate that that consciousness depends on a subcortical system, whereas the contents of 
consciousness are selectively located in cortical areas . . . . Fetal development of the tha-
lamus occurs much earlier than the sensory cortex, providing the substrate and mechan-
isms for conscious pain perception well before the third trimester of human gestation.”). 
131 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-23B-2(5) (2011) (finding that a fetus feels pain after twenty weeks 
and subjecting a fetus to painful stimuli may cause disabilities later in life); ARK. CODE 
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troduced in Congress would have required that all physicians read a 
federally written script to patients informing them that at twenty 
weeks the fetus is pain-capable.132 
In April 2010, Nebraska went a step further and enacted a law 
banning, except for a narrow set of emergency situations, all abor-
tions twenty weeks after fertilization because of fetal capacity to expe-
rience pain.  It had held one hearing on the bill, with evidence from 
five physicians who were “experts” in pain management or fetal med-
icine, but heard from no physicians or scientists with a different 
view.133  The law made the following findings of fact: 
(1) At least by twenty weeks after fertilization there is substantial evidence 
that an unborn child has the physical structures necessary to experience 
pain; 
(2) There is substantial evidence that, by twenty weeks after fertilization, 
unborn children seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner in which in an 
infant or an adult would be interpreted as a response to pain; 
(3) Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn children who have 
developed twenty weeks or more past fertilization who undergo prenatal 
surgery; 
(4) Even before twenty weeks after fertilization, unborn children have 
been observed to exhibit hormonal stress responses to painful stimuli.  
 
ANN.  § 20-16-1104 (West 2011) (mandating the physician notify the patient of potential 
risk of the surgery as well as the availability of anesthetics to reduce the pain of the fetus); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-503(5) (West 2011) (finding that anesthesia is used to reduce the 
pain of the fetus during surgical procedures); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (West 2011) 
(finding that consent is only determined after, among other requirements, the female is 
given notice of the availability of anesthetics to reduce the pain of the fetus); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 188.027 (West 2004) (requiring the physician to notify the patient of anesthetic’s 
usefulness is eliminating pain to the fetus during the procedure); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-
3,104–05 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (finding that an unborn fetus feels pain after twenty 
weeks, anesthesia will reduce the pain felt during a medical procedure, and a doctor must 
notify the patient of these facts before performing the procedure); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, § 1-738.9 (West 2011) (requiring the physician to notify the patient if anesthetics 
would reduce the pain of the fetus during the procedure). 
132 Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2010, H.R. 5276, 111th Cong. § 3302 (2010); see also 
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2011, S. 314, 112th Cong. § 3402 (2011). 
133 See, e.g., Hearing on LB 1103, supra note 21 (statement of Dr. Ferninand Salvacion, a physi-
cian practicing exclusively in the area of pain management but with no direct experience 
with fetuses or developmental research) (testifying that with regard to physical structures, 
the neurotransmitters in the spinal column that mediate pain transmission appear early 
in development and all the neural components required for processing perception of 
pain are present in the fetus by twenty weeks gestational age; that electroencephalograms 
measuring discrete electrical activity from cortical neurons are present by nineteen to 
twenty weeks and sustained patterns can be recorded from fetuses of twenty-three weeks 
gestational age; and that stress responses demonstrated by hormonal output can also be 
measure as early as sixteen weeks gestational age). 
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Such responses were reduced when pain medication was administered 
directly to such unborn children . . . .134 
As noted, the Nebraska law would not be constitutional under via-
bility as survivability precedents, but its main sponsor, right-to-life 
Senator Flood, claimed a constitutional basis not centered on the is-
sue of viability but in “protecting an unborn child from feeling pain 
during an  abortion.”135  He found support for his position in state-
ments in Casey and Gonzales that the state has leeway to express its in-
terest in the unborn child throughout the pregnancy.  He also relied 
on Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Carhart v. Stenberg that “Casey is pre-
mised on the states having an important constitutional role in defin-
ing their interests in the abortion debate,” as the pain-capable law at-
tempts to do.136  He also noted that Gonzales permitted the states wider 
discretion in matters of scientific uncertainty, at least when there was 
a body of medical opinion supporting the state’s stance.137 
The validity of the Nebraska law will turn on the strength of the 
medical and scientific consensus about when a fetus feels pain and 
whether a clear consensus even matters for constitutional purposes.  
With fetal pain now widely studied, medical and scientific experts 
agree that the fetus becomes pain-capable at twenty-eight weeks, with 
some thinking that the point is earlier, say at twenty-six or twenty-four 
weeks.  K.J.S. Anand, who finds a structural basis for pain-capability 
even earlier than twenty weeks, holds a minority view.138  Alone, such a 
physiologic basis for pain would not seem to be an adequate basis for 
a public policy that bans all abortions after twenty weeks, and argua-
bly would not even support a mandatory informed consent law about 
fetal pain-capability.139  Still, Gonzales was very deferential to Con-
gress’s view of the lack of health need for a partial birth abortion, al-
 
134 Pain-Capable Unborn Children Protection Act, L.B. 1103, 2010 Leg., 101st Sess. (Neb. 
2010). 
135 Hearing on LB 1103, supra note 21, at 18. 
136 Id. at 15; see also I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the 
Constitution, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 237 (2011) (noting that viability is arguably not 
the only compelling reason for restricting abortion). 
137 Id. 
138 See Unborn Pain Hearings, supra note 126, at 38 (arguing that most physicians do not think 
a fetus can feel pain before twenty weeks). 
139 The question of whether the federal government should address this issue through a fed-
eral fetal pain informed consent or leave it to the states is a different question than 
whether there is enough scientific evidence, despite the absence of consensus, that wom-
en undergoing abortion after twenty weeks should be so informed.  The existence of 
some evidence of pain-capable fetuses at twenty weeks makes such an informed consent 
law arguably non-ideological, for some women who abort might then choose to have a 
fetal anesthetic administered.  Still, the scientific consensus lies somewhere after twenty-
four to twenty-eight weeks, not the much earlier minority viewpoint of twenty weeks. 
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lowing the state to set the standard when there were mixed medical 
views.  Depending on the state of evidence when such a law was liti-
gated, the courts could conceivably find that there was enough evi-
dence of a scientific and medical consensus, though still contro-
verted, to support such a finding. 
Even if there were a robust medical and scientific consensus about 
a fetus’s pain-capability at twenty weeks, the question would then be 
the constitutional significance of that fact for a ban on abortion.  Ne-
braska legislation claims that preventing a twenty-week fetus from suf-
fering the pain of an abortion is a compelling state interest.  But such 
pain could be alleviated by having the fetus anesthesized before the 
abortion.140  To be valid then the claim of compelling interest would 
have to rest less on whether the fetus actually felt pain during the 
abortion and more on what the development of pain-capability itself 
signified.  But this is the issue presented by viability as survivability as 
an adequate ground for limiting abortion.  If the best explanation of 
that ground is that survivability is a sufficiently objective marker of 
development that the state may then limit abortions for reasons less 
purely personal or quasi-religious than are the reasons for valuing fe-
tuses at earlier stages of development, the question is why pain-
capability is not an independent marker of a more objective basis for 
such valuation. 
Addressing the independent importance of fetal pain sensation 
aside from survivability thus requires courts to address directly why a 
state may value fetuses more than a woman’s interest in ending a 
pregnancy, just as it must do when it unpacks the logical and biologi-
cal importance of viability as advances in neonatology require.  The 
Nebraska legislators thought that technological evidence of pain-
capability would settle the matter tout court, just as Senator Lindsey 
Graham and others think that pushing viability as survivability back 
earlier will settle the matter.  That is not the case.  Confronting why 
neither pain-capability nor viability settles the matter is still a fruitful 
enterprise in that it unpacks the web of values at stake in the viability 
 
140 See infra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (discussing efforts in Baze v. Kennedy to 
make sure that the executed prisoner do not experience pain from lethal injection); see 
also Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 136, at 239–40 (highlighting the use of analgesics to pre-
vent fetal pain).  In any event, vaginal birth will also cause pain to fetuses and newborns 
when their capability for experiencing pain is even more developed.  Although the re-
ward for the pain of vaginal birth is life, abortion at twenty weeks when viability is itself 
unlikely could occur with anesthesia to prevent the speculative pain of the abortion. 
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line.  The conclusions reached could have implications for restric-
tions at earlier stages as well.141 
 
VII.  NONINVASIVE PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND THE REASONS FOR 
ABORTION 
A technology that has even more potential to wreak havoc with 
understandings of abortion and abortion rights is early noninvasive 
prenatal diagnosis (“NIPD”).  Several medical and scientific groups 
are now developing techniques for identifying and genotyping cell-
free fetal nucleic acids (DNA and RNAs) found in a pregnant wom-
an’s bloodstream, and using that to identify chromosomal abnormali-
ties or genetic mutations in the fetus.142  If these techniques achieve a 
high degree of reliability (sensitivity and specificity), they open the 
door to early, noninvasive prenatal diagnosis in millions of women 
and a likely great upsurge in the number of early abortions, which 
can be done chemically up to nine weeks.  Such a prospect will lead 
some states to restrict prenatal testing in various ways, including the 
conditions tested for, thus drawing into contention the reasons for 
abortion and the right of women to obtain the information needed to 
make termination decisions.  This opens a new battleground in the 
abortion wars, with implications for genetic testing, the selection of 
embryos, and the right of a woman to exercise prebirth control over 
offspring characteristics. 
Noninvasive collection of fetal DNA and RNAs is the latest devel-
opment in sixty years of medical efforts to assess the fetus and its 
prospects for a healthy life before birth.143  These efforts began with 
the discovery in 1959 of the chromosomal rearrangement that causes 
Down syndrome—a third bit of chromosome at Chromosome 21.  In 
 
141 The argument from animal welfare laws is not sufficient to settle the matter because such 
laws protect sentient animals against cruelty and death only in situations in which killing 
animals is acceptable, including, for example, euthanasia, killing for food, hunting, med-
ical research, and the like.  Even in those prohibited situations the animals are viable and 
clearly capable of suffering, which is not the case with twenty-week post-fertilization fetus-
es. 
142 See CAROLINE WRIGHT, CELL-FREE FETAL NUCLEIC ACIDS FOR NON-INVASIVE PRENATAL 
DIAGNOSIS:  REPORT OF THE UK EXPERT WORKING GROUP (2009), available at  
http://www.phgfoundation.org/download/ffdna/ffDNA_report.pdf (detailing a com-
prehensive review of methodologies and issues arising from the introduction of noninva-
sive prenatal diagnosis). 
143 See, e.g., PETER A. BENN, Prenatal Diagnosis of Chromosomal Abnormalities Through Amniocente-
sis, in GENETIC DISORDERS OF THE FETUS (A. Milunsky & J. Milunsky eds., 6th ed. 2010) 
(reviewing the history of these techniques). 
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the 1960s karyotyping or visualization of chromosomes developed, 
followed by amniocentesis in the late 1960s.  A needle was pushed in-
to the amniotic sac and amniotic fluid withdrawn at fifteen to sixteen 
weeks in pregnancy.  Fetal cells floating in the fluid were cultured 
and karyotyped and aneuploidies (abnormalities in the number of 
chromosomes) detected by the eighteenth week.144  This led to amni-
ocentesis being recommended for women who had a greater risk of 
having a Down child (1 in 200 for those over 35) than the risk they 
had of a miscarriage (<1:200) induced by the intrusion into the ute-
rus to withdraw amniotic fluid.145 
In the 1980s the development of chorion villus sampling (“CVS”) 
pushed the time of prenatal diagnosis back to twelve or fourteen 
weeks, and lowered the risk of miscarriage.  In addition, a combina-
tion of protein markers together with a sonogram of the transparency 
of the fluid behind a fetus’s neck gave enough information to justify a 
CVS or amniocentesis in women who did not have advanced maternal 
age or other risk factors.  With this screening test, which poses no risk 
to the pregnancy, a patient and doctor together can determine 
whether the patient wants the CVS or amniocentesis, which does pose 
a risk.146 
Another prenatal diagnostic technique—preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (“PGD”)—allows the screening of embryos prior to preg-
nancy.147  PGD, however, requires in vitro fertilization instead of coital 
conception.  Embryos have a cell clipped and analyzed, and some 
embryos will be discarded rather than transferred.  First developed in 
1990 for cystic fibrosis, it is now used for several hundred congenital 
conditions, most of them quite rare.  It has also been extended to 
adult-onset diseases and risk factors, such as for breast and colon can-
cer, which appear only in adult years.  It can also be used to deter-
mine the sex of embryos and other nonmedical traits as the genes de-
 
144 Id. 
145 See Ray Fisman, When Does Amnio Make Sense, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2011, 12:42 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2281570/ (arguing that amniocentesis should be offered to 
younger women, who despite showing less risk of having a child with Down syndrome—
roughly 1:2000—the likelihood that they would be able to conceive again is much higher; 
medical guidelines call for counseling them about the choice, but only a minority of doc-
tors offer them the choice). 
146 See Mark H. Yudin, Tracy L. Prosen & Daniel V. Landers, Multiple-marker Screening in Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus-positive Pregnant Women:  Screen Positivity Rates with the Triple and 
Quad Screens, 189 AM. J. OF. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 973, 973-76 (2003). 
147 Dr. Samuel Marcus, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), IVF-INFERTILITY.COM, 
http://www.ivf-infertility.com/ivf/pgd.php (last updated June 19, 2011, 10:12 PM). 
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termining them become known.148  But PGD is not cheap or easy and 
will not appeal to most people, except those at risk for offspring with 
genetic disease and possibly those otherwise going through IVF for 
infertility. 
An ideal prenatal test for all age groups would be one that in-
volved no intrusion into the uterus (and hence no risk of miscar-
riage) and occurred early enough so that a termination might occur 
chemically rather than surgically.149  Techniques for sequencing cell-
free fetal DNA and RNA’s circulating in a pregnant woman’s blood 
stream now offer that possibility.  Researchers have now shown that a 
simple blood test for mothers could detect Down syndrome in their 
fetuses and the fetal genotype at thousands of sites.150  If the technol-
ogy develops as hoped, it will be possible by a simple blood test at 
four to five weeks after a missed period to determine 95% of aneup-
loidies and in the future many other genetic features, including fetal 
sex, risk factors for a wide variety of diseases throughout life, and po-
tentially even a complete genome sequence. 
With 4.6 million births occurring in the United States annually, 
there will be a huge market demand for such tests, and many factors 
pushing physicians to make such testing routine, including fear of 
wrongful birth lawsuits if they fail to offer such tests and a child is 
born with a condition that the parents would have wished to avoid.151  
If this occurs, many more women will receive noninvasive prenatal 
diagnostic or screening tests, often without their full informed con-
sent, and then be presented with information that will present the 
option of an early medical or chemical abortion due to fetal risk fac-
tors.152 
There are many problems with this technology, both in establish-
ing its safety and efficacy, and then introducing it to the health care 
system in a way that will respect informed consent, provide meaning-
 
148 John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis:  The Ethical Debate, 18 HUM. 
REPROD. 465, 465–71 (2003). 
149 Insurance coverage of both the test and later actions taken on it would also be important, 
as would doctors, nurses, and counselors ability to familiarize themselves with the tests 
and their importance.  See Jaime S. King, And Genetic Testing For All . . . The Coming Revolu-
tion in Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Testing,  RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011–12) (on 
file with author). 
150 Henry T. Greely, Get Ready for the Flood of Fetal Gene Screening, 469 NATURE 289, 289 (2011). 
151 See King, supra note 149, at 15.  Some states, however, may bar damages in such situations.  
See supra note 7. 
152 Peter A. Benn & Audrey R. Chapman, Ethical Challenges in Providing Noninvasive Prenatal 
Diagnosis, 22 CURRENT OPINION IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 128, 130–31 (2010); Peter 
A. Benn & Audrey R. Chapman, Practical and Ethical Considerations of Noninvasive Prenatal 
Diagnosis, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2154, 2154 (2009). 
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ful counseling, and expand women’s choices in a way that meets their 
and their families’ needs.  Advocates of women’s rights will be as in-
terested in ensuring safety, efficacy, informed consent, and meaning-
ful counseling as anyone.  As King and others have pointed out, there 
is a strong need for a two-step information and counseling process 
before any testing is done, and then extensive counseling about test 
results, a process that will be expensive and beyond current genetic 
counseling resources.153  The FDA should require a high threshold for 
the clinical validity and utility of such tests before they are introduced 
into general use.154 
I want to focus instead on the likely reaction of anti-abortion 
groups to such a great increase in prenatal testing and hence upsurge 
in the number of first trimester abortions that would occur if such 
tests are established as safe and effective and meaningful consent and 
counseling regimens are followed.  One reaction would be to ban the 
tests for certain indications, for example, for sex or other nonmedical 
conditions, or conditions that were risk factors alone for later disease.  
This would, however, raise the question of whether states could re-
strict the reasons for abortion, and thus by implication the tests on 
which those reasons depend. 
Such laws would present a major challenge to Roe and Casey be-
cause the Court, perhaps because it has never been directly faced 
with such a question, has never indicated the acceptability of restric-
tions on reasons for why a woman has an abortion.  Her decision that 
the pregnancy is unwanted alone has been enough.  Restrictions on 
early prenatal testing or restrictions on the use of prenatal test results 
to abort would challenge the right to have an abortion for any reason 
and would open the door to restricting abortion for reasons beyond 
sex or other nonmedical trait selection.155  The outcome of such a 
challenge would also affect genetic selection and alteration of 
offspring traits in assisted reproduction and the genetic screening 
and alteration technologies of the future. 
To assess this issue we must first see if states could restrict the 
grounds for abortion.  If they could, presumably they could then re-
strict tests that would provide that information.  If they could not re-
strict those reasons, there would still be the question of whether they 
 
153 See King, supra note 149, at 31–32. 
154 Unless the tests are sold as kits, as opposed to tests done in individual laboratories, the 
FDA may not require such review. 
155 Ultrasounds have been banned in India because of their use in sex selection, but there 
are other reasons for doing ultrasounds which will also convey information about sex. 
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could ban tests providing information that would be necessary to 
make such a choice. 
A. Reasons for Abortion as a Limit 
A right to abort based on the reason for the abortion—for why a 
woman wants to terminate a pregnancy—would be a new departure.  
The Supreme Court has never conditioned the abortion right on a 
particular reason for the woman’s choice.  Opposition to abortions 
based on sex and other nonmedical traits, growing out of early pre-
natal diagnosis, could raise that issue.  If the Court allowed a ban on 
abortion for a particular reason, it would open a new front in the 
abortion wars with implications for sexual and reproductive behavior, 
prenatal genetic diagnosis, embryo selection in assisted reproduction, 
and choice over prebirth selection of children’s traits generally. 
The staunchest anti-abortion views permit abortion only in the 
rarest and most exceptional case—where continuing the pregnancy 
directly threatens the life of the woman.  Indeed, many abortion op-
ponents are leery of other claimed justifications, including rape, in-
cest, fetal deformity, or serious impact on the health of the woman.156  
The most extreme response is reflected legally in the South Dakota 
law, subsequently overturned in a referendum, that would have 
banned abortion in all cases except to protect the life of the moth-
er.157 
Thus abortion opponents have ample grounds to oppose early 
NIPD simply because it will increase the number of abortions on 
grounds that they find unacceptable.  Early noninvasive prenatal di-
agnosis, however, gives them more purchase for scrutiny of the rea-
sons for abortion, for it raises the prospect of early abortions for sex 
selection and other unappealing reasons.  Three states already ban 
 
156 Anti-abortionists reject an exception for the health of the mother even if limited to se-
rious physical health out of fear that the exception will swallow the rule because “health” 
includes mental or psychological health and thus operates as no constraint at all.  See 
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (holding that a statute permitting abor-
tions that preserve the health of the mother included mental health).  Indeed, it was this 
concern with a health exception that drove the enactment of the federal partial birth 
abortion ban upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163–67 (2007).  See Hearing on 
LB 1103, supra note 21, at 19–20 (explaining the limited mental health exception of the 
Nebraska fetal pain bill).  The Hyde Amendment would allow federal funding for abor-
tion for rape or incest when promptly reported, as well as where the mother’s life was 
threatened.  Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). 
157 H.B. 1215, 2006 Legis. Assemb., 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006).  The referendum that operated as 
a veto of the law won by 55% to 44%.  South Dakota Referred Law 6, the Abortion Ban Referen-
dum, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/South_Dakota_Abortion_
Ban_Referendum_%282006%29 (last modified Sept. 23, 2011). 
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sex as a reason for abortion.158  Although none has yet been chal-
lenged on substantive grounds, the wider and earlier availability of 
sex selection abortions may present that case directly.  The argument 
for banning abortion for sex selection or other nonmedical traits 
would be that such abortions pose such great risks to women and so-
ciety that they provide the compelling state interest needed to justify 
a ban on abortion, thus opening the door to claims that other rea-
sons for abortion also pose individual or societal risks and could be 
banned. 
Anti-abortion forces find allies here in the disability rights com-
munity.  Early prenatal diagnosis will undoubtedly lead to an increase 
in the scope and frequency of fetal anomaly or disability-related 
grounds for abortion, which woman are much more likely to choose 
than abortion for sex selection alone.  Disability rights advocates are 
often conflicted about aborting fetuses with their condition or that of 
their colleagues.  They view prenatal testing and abortions for such 
conditions as a form of eugenics, albeit privately chosen, which fos-
ters stigma and discrimination against people with disabilities, reduc-
es their numbers, and makes it difficult to lobby for treatment and re-
search.159  Many of them will add their guns to pro-life support for a 
ban on abortion for the conditions presented by early prenatal diag-
nosis. 
The pro-choice side, of course, recognizes any reason for abortion 
as adequate, at least legally.  What matters to them is a woman’s 
choice.  Individuals might judge a woman’s reasons on moral 
grounds and choose not to make those same choices, but they fer-
vently object to any legal limit on that choice.  The Supreme Court 
appears to have adopted that position because it has never suggested, 
perhaps because such issue has never been directly presented, that 
some reasons are more acceptable than others, except in the case of 
protecting the mother’s life or health in postviability or other prohi-
bited abortions.  Indeed, any such requirement would pose enorm-
ous administrative and implementation problems to be successful, 
and produce bans on the tests on which such abortions would be 
based. 
Laws that ban sex selection abortion most directly challenge the 
claim that a woman may abort a pregnancy for any reason.  With 
 
158 Illinois and Pennsylvania have also banned nonmedical sex selection abortion.  Illinois 
Abortion Law of 1975, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8) (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3204(c) (West 2000). 
159 ERIK PARENS & ADRIENNE ASCH, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS CRITIQUE OF PRENATAL GENETIC 
TESTING:  REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS S1–S2 (Supp. 1999). 
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three states now having such a ban, more challenges are likely to 
arise.160  If so, the Court would have to consider its apparent position 
that the reasons for the abortion are for the woman to decide and 
cannot be mandated or supervised by the state.  In such a challenge, 
the question posed would be whether sex selection abortion for 
nonmedical reasons presented a compelling ground for limiting pre-
viability abortions.  India, China, and other nations may have good 
reason to be against sex selection on public policy grounds, especially 
if women’s interests are directly affected and sex ratio imbalances and 
other societal disruption occurs, as had been the case in India and 
China. 
But that is not the situation in the United States where women’s 
rights are generally protected and the sex ratio imbalances are not 
likely even if sex selection abortion is lawful.  Also, there are many 
less restrictive alternatives available, such as permitting nonmedical 
sex selection for gender variety in the family.  If such a challenge 
arose, my guess is that the Court would be reluctant to open the door 
to restriction that rested on evaluation of a woman’s reasons for abor-
tion.  The same answer should be forthcoming with regard to disabili-
ty-related abortions.  As long as the state is not encouraging them, 
they too should be within the purview of a woman’s choice, particu-
larly when disability rights are otherwise so strongly protected. 
If this analysis is correct, then a woman could abort for reasons or 
factors revealed in prenatal tests that some persons would find trivial 
or frivolous, such as hair or eye color, athletic or musical prowess, a 
higher adult risk for cancer, or any of the risk factors that a full-
throated genomics will reveal.  But that should not be surprising be-
cause women can abort now for many reasons that some would find 
trivial, negligent, or irresponsible, e.g., a failure to use birth control, 
an unwillingness to postpone a trip or some other event.  Different 
women value prenatal life differently, and will do so at different stag-
es of pregnancy.  The power of Roe and Casey is that the Constitution 
appears to allow the woman to make this choice without scrutiny of 
her reasons for doing so.  It should continue to do so despite the 
greater likelihood of abortion for genetic indications as a result of 
early noninvasive prenatal diagnosis. 
 
160 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011) (West); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West 
2000).  A challenge to a 2010 Oklahoma ban on sex selection abortions was struck down 
because it violated a state constitutional provision against bills involving more than a sin-
gle subject, not on substantive grounds of limits on the reasons for abortion.  Davis v. 
Edmondson, No. CJ-2009-9154, 2010 WL 1734636 (D. Okla. Mar. 2, 2010). 
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B. Prenatal Tests 
Regardless of whether abortion can be restricted for particular 
reasons, anti-abortion groups are likely to attempt to restrict access to 
the prenatal tests providing the information on which the expected 
upsurge of abortion depend.  Rather than restrict abortion directly, 
they might focus their efforts on limiting earlier testing, particularly 
for sex and other nonmedical traits, or for risk factors other than 
aneuploidy.161 
Such bans would appear to impose an undue burden on the right 
to abortion because depriving women of such tests would by “purpose 
or effect . . . plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”162  The obstacle arises from 
denying women the information they need to decide whether to con-
tinue a pregnancy.  At first blush the logic of this position is obvious:  
women want the information so they can decide whether to continue 
the pregnancy.  If they have the information, they may then decide 
not to do so.  Prenatal test results would directly affect whether a 
woman continues or terminates a pregnancy. 
But one can foresee obstacles to recognition of such a position.  
First, women might find the prenatal diagnosis relevant to their deci-
sion only after they have the information in hand.  They may not be 
able to decide beforehand what they want; indeed, most of them will 
not know what information might be relevant or how they might act 
on it until they are tested, learn the results, and understand its signi-
ficance. 
Second, the Court might draw a line between banning an abor-
tion for a particular reason and banning the information on which 
that decision depends.  An early First Amendment case involving 
abortion, Bigelow v. Virginia, suggests the contrary.163  There the Court 
struck down on commercial speech grounds a law that banned adver-
tising information about where abortion services might be ob-
tained.164  Although commercial speech is not directly at issue in the 
early prenatal testing context, Bigelow does illustrate the point that in-
formation prior to a decision is protected because of its relationship 
to the decision, which it facilitates.165 
 
161 Indeed, a ban on tests is likely to be much more successful in stopping such abortions 
than in banning abortions for particular reasons, even if it is constitutional to do so, be-
cause the tests will be necessary to decide whether to keep or end a pregnancy. 
162 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
163 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
164 Id. at 829. 
165 Id. at 822.  A similar point could be made with regard to laws restricting advertisement or 
sale of guns and ammunition or banning shooting ranges.  If there is a Second Amend-
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Stanley v. Georgia, on the other hand, shows that the Court is capa-
ble of distinguishing between a right to do something and a right to 
obtain the object or service needed to exercise the right to engage in 
that activity.166  Stanley had found a First Amendment right to possess 
obscene material in the home.167  But later cases, e.g., Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, held that there was no right to buy obscenity in the 
public square because of effects on the community of open commer-
cial sale of obscenity.168  United States v. Reidel carried this one step 
forward by banning use of the mails to obtain the materials in the 
home.169  So the acts and conduct necessary to exercise the right to 
read obscenity in the home protected in Stanley could be banned, 
even if once the obscene materials arrived there they were pro-
tected.170 
Of course restrictions on early, noninvasive prenatal tests are justi-
fied when needed to ensure the safety and efficacy of the tests and to 
ensure that women are fully informed and properly counseled before 
the options they will face if tested.  But once those method restric-
tions are in place, further restrictions based on what traits the test re-
veal (medical vs. nonmedical, risk factors vs. higher certainty) should 
not be upheld.  They are attempts to restrict abortion on for condi-
tions revealed by the tests, and are very likely to have that effect, at 
least in the case of women who want the tests generally so they can 
learn more about the fetus before they decide to continue or end the 
pregnancy. 
This is true even if the tests reveal information that some persons 
might regard as weak, trivial, or unimportant reasons for terminating 
 
ment right to possess handguns for self-defense, there is an implied right to purchase 
guns and ammunition.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding 
that a D.C. ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment be-
cause they are a popular weapon of choice for self-defense).  While the Court did recog-
nize that commercial restrictions on gun sales would still be constitutional, it is unlikely 
that a ban on advertising gun prices or sales would withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Id. 
at 626–27. 
166 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
167 Id. at 568. 
168 413 U.S. 49, 57–58, 68–69 (1973). 
169 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971). 
170 Ireland, which has a very restrictive abortion policy, has struggled with a mirror question 
of whether its ban on abortion can also justify a ban on providing information about how 
abortions might be obtained outside of Ireland, a requirement imposed by the European 
Court of Justice.  See generally Allison M. Clifford, Comment, Abortion in International Waters 
Off the Coast of Ireland:  Avoiding a Collision Between Irish Moral Sovereignty and the European 
Community, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 385, 399–404, 416 (2002) (discussing the Irish and Eu-
ropean Community rulings on the right to provide information on obtaining abortions 
outside of Ireland). 
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a pregnancy, such as hair or eye color, a gene disposed to musical or 
athletic ability, or some other trait that some find appealing or others 
find unappealing or offensive.  After all, if abortion of a fetus for 
those reasons could not be stopped, then tests that would accurately 
provide that information should not be stopped either.  It is no dif-
ferent than finding that a law banning gun sales or advertisements 
about where guns might be purchased violates the Second and Four-
teenth Amendment rights to have and bear arms for self-defense. 
The question of a right to prenatal genetic testing has great im-
portance both for abortion and other reproductive technologies.  For 
abortion it opens a backdoor into regulating reasons for abortion by 
decoupling the tests on which the abortion depends from the abor-
tion itself.  If this is allowed, it becomes a way of indirectly restricting 
abortions while appearing to recognize no state right to do so. 
Beyond abortion, it raises the more general question of whether 
reproductive liberty includes the right to choose the genes or traits of 
offspring.171  This question has enormous importance for assisted re-
production and the genetic screening, selection, and alteration tech-
nologies of the future.  Most immediately, it would affect the devel-
opment and use of preimplantation genetic tests and other assisted 
reproductive techniques for choosing which embryos to discard or 
transfer to the uterus.  True, those decisions do not involve abortion 
directly because they occur before pregnancy, but they determine 
whether a pregnancy will occur.  More generally, they are key to the 
larger question of whether procreative liberty—the liberty to have or 
not have offspring—also involves a liberty right to know the genetic 
or chromosomal makeup of one’s potential offspring and to make 
decisions about going forward with reproduction on that basis. 
C. No Duty to Act on Results or to Be Tested 
The analysis so far in this Part has focused on an expansion of a 
woman’s right to control her reproductive life by obtaining access to 
early prenatal testing and to act on the results.  It recognizes that 
safety and efficacy is essential and that informed consent and coun-
seling that promotes her autonomy be respected.  It respects her 
right to have tests for any medical or nonmedical information that is 
available or that she finds relevant, to know the results, and then to 
make a decision about pregnancy accordingly.  As noted, this position 
 
171 See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 440 
(2003) (discussing the implications of new technologies that reveal genomic information 
of prospective offspring). 
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has important implications for genetic screening and selection of 
embryos and for the genetic technologies of the future. 
The flip side of the right to obtain and act on prenatal informa-
tion is that persons also have a right not to have or act on that infor-
mation.  If the state cannot prevent testing and use of test results, 
even if it leads to many more early abortions for a wider range of in-
dications, it also follows that women are protected from having to ab-
ort on those grounds, and possibly even being tested, or if tested, be-
ing presented with test results.  The premises of Roe and Casey thus 
authorize a private eugenics, but at the same time they bring the gate 
down on a public eugenics based on such testing.  This is a necessary 
implication of a liberal regime of rights; reproductive rights are nega-
tive rights against the state to do or not do something concerning a 
decision to reproduce.  They are a sword against state action that 
would limit such choice, and a shield against state action that would 
demand it.  Private insurers and employers, however, may impose 
such duties unless there is legislation against them, as Congress has 
done in banning discrimination in health insurance and employment 
based on genetic tests.172 
The right to refuse genetic-based action is clearest in the case of a 
state policy that mandates abortion based on the characteristics of the 
pregnant woman or the fetus that she is carrying.  Although unlikely 
in the present political situation, a state-mandated policy that pre-
vents some women from reproducing once pregnant would run afoul 
of Roe and Casey, just as would a law that prevented women from not 
reproducing in those circumstances.173  A state eugenics policy—
either pro or con—cannot survive if it mandates, rather than accom-
modates, choice.  Although Buck v. Bell’s imprimatur on a state eu-
genics program aimed at the mentally unfit and feeble-minded has 
never been directly reversed, later cases strongly suggest that such a 
law is unlikely to be upheld today.174 
 
172 See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (forbidding discrimina-
tion in healthcare and employment based on genetic information). 
173 Justice Goldberg noticed this point in his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut.  381 U.S. 
479, 496–97 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  If the state could prevent women from 
using birth control, it could also require them to do so.  This point has been lost in the 
anti-abortion and birth control debate. 
174 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (protecting personal de-
cisions about procreation, contraception, and family relations); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right to privacy includes right to bear or beget child-
ren); Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that manda-
tory sterilization of a habitual thief violates a basic civil right).  See generally Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).  Mandatory sterilization, abortion, or birth control when it can 
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The main threat to women uninterested in genetic testing, how-
ever, might come not from state-mandated eugenic programs, but 
from the actions of employers, insurers, drug companies, and medi-
cal researchers.  In a system of universal coverage insurers and em-
ployers may not be able to refuse to hire or not provide coverage to 
women who knowingly carry to term pregnancies they know will re-
sult in babies with very high medical costs due to disability.  Nor is the 
state likely explicitly to ban such choices or bar treatment of them.175  
Social stigma, however, may result against parents who reproduce de-
spite knowing that there is a high risk that their child will have severe 
disability and impose high costs on the medical system.  Also, re-
searchers and drug companies will shift their agendas away from dis-
abilities that can easily be prevented with early abortions so that there 
are few specialized treatments available and little demand to develop 
them, because so many fewer children are being born with those 
conditions. 
A closer question, however, which could arise only in a very differ-
ent political climate, would be the legitimacy of government mandat-
ing that women be presented with information about their fetus so 
that they could make the decision themselves.  There would be fewer 
problems here if the state mandated only that women be informed of 
the existence and availability of such tests, including that the state 
would fund them for particular indications, and provided meaningful 
informed consent and counseling about the risks and benefits to the 
woman of the test.  Such a state policy would survive attack unless it 
in fact represented a veiled way to mandate the test itself.  States with 
large Medicaid rolls might find it in their interest to encourage test-
ing by informing women that such tests are available and then paying 
for them.176  Such actions might be acceptable if the notification oc-
curred in a manner and setting that did not question the woman’s 
decisional autonomy and did not become a form of ideological 
browbeating, as mandatory viewing of fetal sonograms arguably is. 
 
be shown to be in the best interest of an incompetent person (a different set of interests 
than state welfare or eugenic interests) is a different matter.  See In re Guardianship of 
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1980) (holding that sterilization of a mentally disabled 
minor must be shown to be in her best interest). 
175 See discussion of treatment discretion over severely handicapped children, supra note 115; 
In re Baby “K,” 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that federal law requires treat-
ment of babies with anencephaly). 
176 States like California that have high Medicaid expenses might encourage such testing and 
fund abortions based on test results, especially if they otherwise provide public funding of 
elective abortion. 
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The harder question would arise in a changed political environ-
ment where a state that wanted to cut down on the birth of children 
with serious anomalies or other costly conditions might mandate ear-
ly noninvasive prenatal testing for everyone or at least put the burden 
on women to opt out of such testing.  Mandatory prenatal testing of 
women now exists for HIV and other conditions that fit within a pub-
lic health rationale of protecting offspring and women’s health.  In 
those cases there are treatments to prevent vertical or horizontal 
transmission.  In the case of abortion, however, the “treatment” pre-
vents the birth of the child who is to be protected.  In a tort system 
based on person-affecting theories of harm, it is difficult to sustain a 
wrongful life claim on behalf of children whose claim is that they 
never would have been born at all, though there are healthcare and 
other costs that would likely be borne by others.177  Most of the condi-
tions for which early prenatal testing would be informative would not 
come close to meeting the severity of outcome needed for a wrongful 
or diminished life claim.  The case for such hypothetical policy would 
have to rest on grounds of preventing higher costs to the medical 
care system and ensuring fully informed consent of persons before 
reproduction, not just the chance to obtain that information through 
early testing. 
Saving money and making sure that women are fully informed is a 
rational basis for state action.  The question is whether such laws in-
terfere with reproductive choice or some other right to such an ex-
tent that a standard higher than rational basis must be met, as argua-
bly requiring viewing or description of fetal sonograms do.  The 
intrusion on bodily integrity is a blood draw, which might be happen-
ing anyway.  There is a very low risk of harm or adverse reaction, 
much lower than with the risk of immunizations.  Indeed, if blood 
can be drawn against a person’s will to test blood alcohol levels while 
driving, it might also be constitutionally acceptable to require that a 
pregnant woman give a blood sample for early fetal testing.178  The 
 
177 See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 
AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004) (exploring the implications of assisted reproduction for 
offspring and others); I. Glenn Cohen, Well, What About the Children? Best Interests Reason-
ing, the New Eugenics, and the Regulation of Reproduction, GRUTER INST. SQUAW VALLEY CONF 
2010:  LAW, INSTITUTIONS & HUMAN BEHAVIOR, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608330 (last updated Oct. 13, 2010) (discussing state policy and 
intervention in reproduction). 
178 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (holding that surgical removal of a bullet to 
prove a connection with crime may be done without consent if it is reasonable when 
comparing the individual’s rights and society’s interests); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 771–72 (1966) (holding that a blood test to prove intoxication was constitution-
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same result could be reached without an additional blood draw if ten 
milliliters of blood were withdrawn at the same time that other blood 
tests are done.  Of course, there would have to be staunch protection 
for the privacy of those samples and the information derived from 
them.179 
Nor would a mandatory blood draw interfere with reproductive 
choice.  This is clearest if the blood were withdrawn and tests run, but 
the results not communicated to the woman unless she asks for them 
(and the samples then discarded and robust protection of their pri-
vacy is put in place), for no decision based on them would occur.  
Unlike forced viewing/hearing of sonograms, she would not be 
forced to learn the results, much less be obligated to act on them.  If 
she were nevertheless informed of the results, she should still retain 
her right not to act on them.  In my view forcing her to confront pre-
natal test results would cross the line just as forced viewing of a sono-
gram would.  If the forced sonogram is deemed too onerous for the 
woman, too much piling on of information and material with an 
emotional impact but not affect the outcome in most cases, then be-
ing told the results of early prenatal testing should not be mandated 
either. 
In the end, there is a symmetry here in state policy for sonograms 
and early noninvasive prenatal testing.  The state can inform of each, 
and maybe can force that a sonogram occur.  But it cannot force a 
woman to view the sonogram, hear a real-time detailed description, 
or act on information revealed by it.180 
Similarly, a state can mandate that women be informed about ear-
ly prenatal testing.  In a hypothetical future, states may even be able 
to require that all women have blood drawn for that purpose, or that 
such tests be done in addition to other mandatory prenatal blood 
tests, but it cannot force women to hear the results or to act on them.  
 
al because there was probable cause and the intrusion was minimal); Breithaupt v. Ab-
ram, 352 U.S. 432, 435–37 (1957) (finding that the withdrawal of blood from an uncons-
cious person by a trained hospital employee did not shock the conscience and thus did 
not violate the Constitution). 
179 The Supreme Court has not yet recognized a right of informational privacy.  See NASA v. 
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 763–64 (2011) (holding that the government could investigate 
employees because any constitutionally recognized privacy interests were protected by the 
Privacy Act of 1974). 
180 I am arguing that the state should not be able to mandate hearing an anatomical descrip-
tion of the fetal sonogram or hear the heartbeat, even though it is possible that courts 
would find doing so acceptable under Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Rights analysis aside, there are many other good policy reasons for 
not enacting such laws, as the mere discussion of them suggests.181 
VIII.  COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The Court’s abortion jurisprudence rests on acceptance of an in-
terpretive role for the judiciary in finding substantive due process 
and equality protection for reproductive liberty.  If the Court has no 
such role, then no constitutional issues of procreative liberty arise.  
On the other hand, if there are substantive due process and equality 
rights, then the question of rights about marriage, family, association, 
reproduction, and children necessarily arise.  And once having 
started down that path, then the question of contraception and by 
implication abortion follow.182  Removing the Roe v. Wade decision 
rule of trimesters and replacing it with an undue burden test does 
not escape that dilemma, nor does anchoring reproductive rights in 
concepts of equality and equal citizenship.  An equality approach may 
free the analysis from due process doctrine, but many of the same 
value and normative judgments remain. 
The technological changes discussed here raise those interpretive 
issues and once again force grappling with their implications.  Forced 
viewing of sonograms, earlier viability, fetal pain and early prenatal 
 
181 A similar analysis would apply to expanded carrier screening for Mendelian defects in the 
general population, which can be done with a cheek swab.  Doctors may have a legal duty 
to offer safe and effective carrier testing to all patients of reproductive age, but whether 
patients could be required to have carrier tests and then act on the results, either by not 
conceiving with another carrier or then undergoing prenatal diagnosis and aborting if 
the fetus has a serious disease, raises issues similar to those just discussed about mandated 
NIPD.  For a description of the technology and its potential implications, see Callum J. 
Bell et al., Carrier Testing for Severe Childhood Recessive Diseases by Next-Generation Sequencing, 
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Jan. 2011, at 1 (describing the vast number of diseases that can 
now be screened for preconception using new sequencing technology); Laird Jackson & 
Reed E. Peyritz, Molecular Technologies Open New Clinical Vistas, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., 
Jan. 2011, at 1 (discussing the ethical, legal, and social implications of preconception and 
prenatal genetic testing and diagnoses); Balaji S. Srinivasan et al., A Universal Carrier Test 
for the Long Tail of Mendelian Disease, 21 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 537 (2010) (detailing a 
simple assay capable of screening large populations and identifying carriers of genetic 
diseases prior to conception). 
182 A standard critique of substantive due process is that there is nothing there:   
[B]ecause Substantive Due Process is such a wonderfully malleable concept, see, 
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (referring to “liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions”), even a firm com-
mitment to apply it would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular. . . . The 
great attraction of Substantive Due Process as a substitute for more specific consti-
tutional guarantees is that it never means never—because it never means anything 
precise. 
  Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2608 
(2010) (Scalia, J.). 
Dec. 2011] ABORTION & TECHNOLOGY 385 
 
diagnosis move the Court and society into further engagement with 
the meaning of its previous holdings.  It may be that courts should be 
loath to enter into this enterprise at all—four members of the current 
Court resist doing so.  But legislatures and society will have to do so as 
they confront the choices that pregnant women and doctors will in-
evitably face with the march of technology. 
Some perspective on the effect of technological change on abor-
tion doctrine may be gained by looking at how changes in other areas 
of technology affect constitutional law.  In some ways the challenges 
of technology for abortion jurisprudence are no different than the 
challenges the Court has to face in confronting technology that af-
fects other areas of constitutional law, most notably search and sei-
zure, national security, copyright, data mining, the internet, and 
much else.183  The Fourth Amendment protection of persons, papers, 
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures is com-
monly cited as an instance in which the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment must change and take account of new surveillance tech-
nologies.  The Court rejected that amendment’s application to wire-
tapping in 1928 when the surveillance involved intruding on outside 
lines but held that there was a physical trespass when a spike mike 
touched the baseboard of a house.184  Katz v. United States changed the 
importance of physical trespass in 1967 when it recognized that elec-
tronic surveillance not involving a trespass could be protected on the 
ground that the Fourth Amendment protected “reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy” that were independent of physical intrusion.185  Here 
protection against the spread of electronic surveillance appeared to 
find a haven in a technologically expanded understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
183 As Justice Kennedy noted in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., “[t]he capacity of technology to 
find and publish personal information, including records required by the government, 
presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it 
seeks to secure.”  131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011). 
184 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (“The language of the 
[Fourth] Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires 
reaching to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office.  The intervening wires 
are not part of his house or office any more than are the highways along which they are 
stretched.”), with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (“For a fair reading 
of the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an 
unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners.”). 
185 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that both a subjective and 
an objective expectation of privacy are required for constitutional protection).  But see 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (concluding that the use of non-trespassory 
thermal imaging technology to determine heat levels in a home is a search). 
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But as Christopher Slogobin has shown, Katz’s potential to broa-
den protection has in fact meant little additional haven from a snoop-
ing government because of Court decisions narrowing searches to 
physical intrusion and to doctrines of knowing exposure, general 
public use, contraband specific, and assumption of the risk.  Togeth-
er these doctrines “have the effect of enabling the government to 
conduct most technologically-aided, virtual searches without having 
to worry about the Fourth Amendment.”186  Other constitutional areas 
will reflect new technologies in different ways, either broadening or 
restricting them in light of precedent, historical understandings and 
much else, as several scholars are now exploring.187 
Lethal injection, a technology adopted to make capital punish-
ment more humane, shows another set of problems facing courts as 
they reconcile new technology with old understandings, in this case 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.  A 
three-drug combination now used in almost all capital punishment 
states aimed to be a more humane method of execution than electro-
cution, hanging, firing squad, or gas chamber.  Baze v. Kentucky dealt 
with a challenge to whether that technology was indeed more hu-
mane.188  The Court held that the injection procedures did not create 
a substantial risk of unnecessary suffering during execution due to 
the chance of erroneous or negligent application, and thus were con-
stitutional. 
The Court’s handling of the challenge to new technology in Baze 
provides a useful contrast to issues raised by technological change for 
abortion doctrine.  At issue in Baze was the relationship between the 
drugs used in the three stage protocol for lethal injection.  Three 
grams of sodium thiopental, a barbiturate which induces uncons-
ciousness, are followed by pancuronum bromide, a muscle paralytic 
agent, and then potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest.  If 
these injection procedures were performed properly, death would be 
 
186 CHRISTOPHER SLOGOBIN, BROOKINGS INST., IS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RELEVANT IN A 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE? 3 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/
2010/1208_4th_amendment_slobogin.aspx (suggesting that Fourth Amendment juri-
sprudence has not kept pace with technological developments). 
187 Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes, The Future of the Constitution Series, BROOKINGS INST., 
http://www.brookings.edu/governance/Future-of-the-Constitution.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2011) (illustrating many of the diverse areas in which emerging technology chal-
lenges established constitutional principles). 
188 See 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (“Petitioners . . . contend that the lethal injection protocol is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unusual punish-
ments,’ because of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not be properly followed, re-
sulting in significant pain.”). 
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painless and swift and thus “humane and constitutional.”189  The peti-
tioners claimed that there was a significant risk that the sodium thi-
opental would not be properly administered so that the prisoner 
might still be conscious and experience painful suffocation from the 
pancuronum bromide and severe burning from the potassium chlo-
ride in violation of the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 
The Court by a 7-2 vote rejected the claim.  It found that the peti-
tioners had not carried their burden of showing a “substantial 
risk . . . .  an objectively intolerable risk” that the protocol would pro-
duce “needless suffering.”190  The current system was not “objectively 
intolerable” because it was the consensus method adopted by states 
and the federal government.  Kentucky also had several safeguards in 
place to minimize the risk of administering an inadequate dose of 
sodium thiopental (including the use of trained personnel, a waiting 
period, and supervision).  Nor had the petitioners’ proposed alterna-
tive been shown to be feasible, readily implemented, and so likely to 
have significantly reduced a substantial risk of severe pain that failure 
to adopt it could be viewed as cruel and unusual.  Although the drug 
is banned in veterinary euthanasia and will cause suffering if the pris-
oner is not fully sedated by the barbiturate, the state had good reason 
for using it because it prevented involuntary seizures or convulsions 
during unconsciousness, thereby preserving the procedure’s dignity 
and hastening death.  This drug combination was also part of the 
Netherlands’ protocol  for assisted suicide and euthanasia.191 
 
189 Id. at 49. 
190 Id. at 50 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191 Obtaining an adequate supply of sodium thiopental, however, may be more of a problem.  
The sole American manufacturer is no longer producing the drug at its plant in Italy be-
cause Italian authorities will not permit export of the drug that might be used in capital 
punishment.  Scarcity of the drug has led to delays in scheduled executions in California 
and Oklahoma, and is likely to disrupt execution schedules in other states.  States are 
eventually expected to follow the lead of Oklahoma and substitute pentobarbital, a more 
easily available anesthetic now widely used in veterinary medicine and authorized for as-
sisted suicide, in a similar three-drug sequence.  But developing new protocols will take 
time and will generate challenges.  Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Drug Used in Executions 
Dropped by U.S. Supplier, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2011, at A11 (describing the consequences 
stemming from a reduction in sodium thiopental supply); Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio to 
Use Assisted Suicide Drug in Executions, STATESMAN.COM (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/nation/ohio-to-use-assisted-suicide-drug-for-
executions-1209969.html?cxtype=rss_news.  Those challenges, however, have not stopped 
Texas and Oklahoma from proceeding with executions using pentobarbital.  See Brandi 
Grissom, Execution Challenge Is First for Texas Appeals Office, TEX. TRIB., May 3, 2011, 
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-dept-criminal-justice/death-penalty/execution-
challenge-first-for-texas-appeals-office/ (noting that this execution would be the first in 
Texas using pentobarbital as part of a three-drug cocktail); Kevin Hayes, John David Duty 
Execution:  Animal Sedative Used in Okla. Inmate’s Execution, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 17, 2010), 
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What insight does Baze offer for courts in reacting to changes in 
abortion technology?  The Court’s close attention to the efficacy of 
the three-drug combination in producing a humane death recalls Jus-
tice Kennedy’s detailed account of partial birth abortion in Gonzales 
v. Carhart and his comparison of piecemeal dismemberment (which 
is allowed) with partial removal of the fetus to a designated landmark 
before demise (which is not).192  He also described how if a physician 
preferred intact dilation and evacuation, she could do so if she gave a 
lethal injection to the fetus prior to intact evacuation, which would 
then be legal because the fetus was already dead.  Such a detailed dis-
cussion of pain is likely to occur with the question of whether a twen-
ty-week old fetus is pain-capable. 
Baze’s close grappling with whether the petitioners’ proposed ex-
ecution alternative is marginally safer casts light on the judiciary’s 
role in evaluating new technologies generally.  There is always the 
risk, well illustrated in Baze, that doing so would embroil the courts in 
resolving on-going scientific controversies beyond their expertise and 
would intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing ex-
ecution and other procedures.  This might often occur on the basis 
of unclear, spotty, and haphazard information.  Indeed, the contro-
versy over whether the lethal injection protocol was effective arose 
from one widely criticized article in the Lancet reporting that post-
execution toxicology showed an insufficient amount of sodium thi-
opental to induce the full unconsciousness that is essential if the pa-
ralytic and cardiac arrest drugs are not to cause severe pain and suf-
fering.193 
As Chief Justice Roberts noted, 
[p]ermitting an Eighth Amendment violation to be established on such a 
showing would threaten to transform courts into boards of inquiry 
charged with determining “best practices” for executions, with each rul-
ing supplanted by another round of litigation touting a new and im-
 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20025984-504083.html (detailing Oklaho-
ma’s use of pentobarbital in executions). 
192 The state interest served in banning partial birth abortions was preserving the dignity of 
the fetus and the medical profession at the margins of life.  See 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 
(2007) (bolstering the congressional argument that it has a legitimate interest in banning 
partial birth abortions). 
193 Leonidas Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 LANCET 
1412, 1412–13 (2005) (suggesting that administration of this particular drug cocktail did 
not sufficiently numb patients to pain).  Contra Jonathan Groner, Inadequate Anaesthesia in 
Lethal Injection for Execution, 366 LANCET 1073, 1073–74 (2005) (“Although Koniaris and 
colleagues’ conclusion that lethal injection has ‘led to the unnecessary suffering of at 
least some of those executed’ is probably true, it is not supported by the data pre-
sented.”). 
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proved methodology.  Such an approach . . . would embroil the courts in 
ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and would sub-
stantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their 
execution procedures—a role that by all accounts the States have fulfilled 
with an earnest desire to provide for a progressively more humane man-
ner of death.194 
Justice Thomas puts the point in comparative institutional terms 
that arguably apply to judicial evaluation of new abortion technolo-
gies as well:  “There is simply no reason to believe that ‘unelected’ 
judges without scientific, medical, or penological training are any 
better suited to resolve the delicate issues surrounding the adminis-
tration of the death penalty than are state administrative personnel 
specifically charged with the task . . . .”195 
In contrast to Baze, I would argue that the importance of the 
technological changes in abortion examined in this Article is less 
about institutional competence in assessing the certainty of new 
techniques than in grappling with their constitutional significance.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito may agree with Jus-
tice Thomas that the Court has no role in how abortion is adminis-
tered because it has no role in that area at all.  But if one follows Roe, 
Casey, and other precedents that give the Court a role in interpreting 
substantive due process and equal protection, one may then ask 
whether grappling with technological change in abortion is different 
than the science arbiter role it was cast into in Baze.  In fact it is.  In 
almost all the areas of technological change in abortion examined, 
the Court was not faced with a dispute about what the science was, 
akin to Baze.196  Instead, once changes in abortion technology are es-
tablished, they confront the Court with the meaning of previously 
understood constitutional doctrine in light of those technologies.197  
 
194 Baze, 553 U.S. at 51. 
195 Id. at 106.  Justice Thomas also stated:   
Under the competing risk standards advanced by the plurality opinion and the 
dissent, for example, the difference between a lethal injection procedure that sa-
tisfies the Eighth Amendment and one that does not may well come down to one’s 
judgment with respect to something as hairsplitting as whether an eyelash stroke is 
necessary to ensure that the inmate is unconscious, or whether instead other 
measures have already provided sufficient assurance of unconsciousness.  
  Id. at 105. 
196 A similar demand for the Court to assess the science did occur in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 
where the health advantages for women of partial birth abortion were in dispute.  550 
U.S. at 161–67.  It would also arise if laws banning abortion because of fetal pain capabili-
ty at eighteen weeks ever reached the Court. 
197 This is true even with fetal pain at twenty weeks, the most scientifically contested of the 
technological advances examined.  Even if the fetus experienced pain at that stage, the 
question of its constitutional significance would remain.  See supra notes 138–40 and ac-
companying text. 
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The inquiry is less about the certainty of the technology and more 
about the underlying meaning and values that, in light of those new 
technologies, give that right its shape.  Because abortion rights are 
themselves a question of substantive due process, they inevitably re-
main so even as further technological change pushes the scope and 
meaning of the right. 
Some of the technologies considered here require a stronger role 
for courts as assessors of technology than others.  With forced viewing 
of sonograms, the question is not the state of the technology but its 
effect and meaning.  Similarly, when viability defined as survivability 
moves earlier, the question is less about what the technology can do, 
than about the different grounds for whether and why earlier survi-
vability should matter.  Whether there is a sufficient medical and 
scientific consensus to find that fetuses are pain-capable at twenty 
weeks might pull courts into more technology assessment than they 
do when they assess the impact of forced viewing of sonograms or of 
early survival of premature newborns in NICUs.  But even if there is 
agreement on when pain-capability arises, the key question will be the 
constitutional meaning of those facts.  Finally, only after the FDA 
blesses early prenatal diagnosis as safe and effective and its use enters 
routine obstetrical practice will the constitutional question of limiting 
abortion for nonmedical or other reasons arise. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Legal disputes arising from fetal sonograms, viability, fetal pain, 
and early prenatal diagnosis are less about the state of the science 
than they are about the meaning of that science within an existing 
structure of constitutional doctrine.  Technological change will re-
main a dream when conceived as a way to lessen the controversy over 
abortion rights that has roiled the country since 1973.  But it will 
force reengagement with the meaning and scope of existing doc-
trines, and may show ways in which change and evolution within 
those doctrines may occur.  As long as one does not invest science 
and technology with too much power, technological change can clari-
fy abortion rights, in some cases extending them and in others cut-
ting them back from how they were previously understood.  In the 
end constitutional values, not technology, matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
